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I.

INTRODUCTION

The managerial horse is out of the judicial barn. Federal Judicial Center' and National Judicial College 2 programs, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure,3 and the Manual for Complex Litigation
t Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law; Professor, School of Public
Health, The University of Alabama at Birmingham; Senior Associate, Program on Negotiation, Harvard Law School; Visiting Professor, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
The National Science Foundation and the National Institute for Dispute Resolution
have provided substantial funding to make it possible for us to develop the litigation management techniques described in the case histories. Many mentors, most notably Judge Sam
A. Pointer, Jr., have assisted me in developing my own abilities to devise and implement
these procedures. Numerous judges-Alvin B. Rubin, Edward R. Becker, Hubert L. Will;
professors-Michael Graetz, Ronald Cass, Wythe Holt, Timothy Hoff; and savants--Edward
Hamilton, Francine Rabinowitz, and Deborah R. Hensler-have given most helpful comments to a previous and substantially different draft of this article. James H. Davis has been
instrumental in developing the footnotes and acting as a sounding board. Barbara St. Clair
has done an absolutely superb job of turning a narrative into a law review article. My gratitude goes out to all of these individuals.
I The Federal Judicial Center was created in 1967 to be the research, development, and
training arm of the federal judiciary. 28 U.S.C. §§ 620-629 (1982) (originally enacted as Act
of Dec. 20, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-210, ch. 42, 81 Stat. 664). Among its assigned duties was "to
develop and present for consideration by the Judicial Conference of the United States recommendations for improvement of the administration and management of the courts of the
United States." 28 U.S.C. § 620(b)(2) (1982). For a description of the Federal Judicial
Center and its operations, see Clark, The Federal Judicial Center, 1974 ARiz. ST. L.J. 537,
539.
a Founded in 1964, the National College of the State Judiciary provides in-residence
training for trial judges. Cady & Coe, Educationof Judicial Personnel:Coals to Newcastle?,
7 CONN. L. REv. 423, 443-45 (1975). Among its goals is "to encourage the use of the latest
techniques to increase court efficiency and improve the quality of justice." Id. at 444 (citing
NATIONAL COLLEGE OF THE STATE JUDICIARY, 1974 BROCHURE 8, 17 (published by the ABA
Judicial Administration Division)).
3 For example, rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has been amended to
authorize the use of "special [pretrial] procedures for managing potentially difficult or protracted actions ...... FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(10); see VanBebber, Recent Amendments to the
FederalRules of Civil Procedure-SomeNew Approaches to Case Management and Limits
on Discovery in Federal Courts, 52 J. KAN. B. ASS'N 247, 247-50 (1983). Rule 26 was similarly changed to curb problems arising during discovery. See Comment, Making Discovery a
Civil Procedure?Proposed Amendments to Rule 26 of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,
1982 ARiz. ST. L.J. 725; see also Batista, Sanctioning Attorneys for Discovery Abuse-The
Recent Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Views from the Bench and
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Second 4 illustrate the significant commitment made by academics
and leaders of the judiciary in encouraging judges to become more
active litigation managers.
Some thoughtful suggestions have been made, however, that
this veritable stampede of judicial management may trample valued aspects of our dispute resolution process.5 An increasingly rich
academic literature cautions that ad hoc decisionmaking concerning appropriate judicial techniques for overseeing more difficult
cases may undermine fundamental procedural fairness. Under this
view, decisions concerning procedure should be made ex
ante-before a judge is aware of the details of a given lawsuit. If
judges engage in ex post applications of procedure, they may imperil our sense of fairness. Another similar notion cautions that
temporary solutions may serve to mask more serious flaws in our
dispute resolution methodology which deserve direct attention.
Compromise may foster rather than obviate injustice.7 Mini solutions may be inappropriate for major problems.8
For those of us who have been actively engaged in managing
complex litigation, these and other criticisms pose a substantial
challenge: to articulate a consistent approach to these cases that
copes with perceived problems in our litigation system while maintaining acceptable standards of due process. This paper is the first
in a planned series of articles designed to expand the analytic literature describing new case management techniques. 9 With a suffiBar, 57 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 671 (1983).
4 See MANUAL FOR

COMPLEX LITIGATION, SECOND (1985). See also the original MANUAL
COMPLEX LITIGATION (1973) and the following commentaries: Forde, Use of the Manual
for Complex Litigation-The Plaintiff's Viewpoint, 15 FORUM 137 (1979); Wyllie, Use of
the Manual for Complex Litigation-The Defendant's Viewpoint, 15 FORUM 163 (1979).
" "If we want judging to be done by judges and only by judges, then we need to institute other changes in addition to increased efficiency. However efficient the judicial branch
may become, it cannot mass-produce judges. Wise decisions cannot be made if cases come in
vast numbers on a judicial assembly line." Rubin, Bureaucratizationof the Federal Courts:
The Tension Between Justice and Efficiency, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 645, 656 (1980).

FOR

RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 72-103 (1985).

See generally Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
Comments of Geoffrey R. Hazard, Jr., as panelist on presentation: Summary of Conclusions & Recommendations, at National Conference on Litigation Management, co-sponsored by Yale Law School, ABA Section on Litigation, and Center for Public Resources, at
New Haven, Connecticut, Oct. 3-5, 1985.
9 Future articles will consider other cases where the author has been a court appointee
in managing complex litigation, such as Wilhoite v. Olin Corporation, where 10,000 named
plaintiffs alleged injuries from exposure to a pesticide; Jenkins v. Raymark, a class action
involving 750 plaintiffs alleging injuries from exposure to asbestos; and In re A.H. Robins,
where over 300,000 claimants alleged injuries from a type of I.U.D. These artiles draw on
case study methodology. For discussion of that subject, see Foreman, The Theory of Case
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cient database of case histories, it may be possible by reasoning
inductively to develop a functional approach for the judicial management of complex cases.
This article commences with a general discussion of trends in
judicial management and alternative dispute resolution techniques.
Next a descriptive methodology for analyzing specific cases is proposed, followed by three case histories presented in accordance
with the proposed methodology. Each of these histories describes
the author's role as an appointee of the court assigned to decide
the case. 10 Finally the article suggests some themes needing further
analysis before it is possible to develop a principled approach to
complex case management.
A.

An Overview of Litigation Management and ADR

Underlying trends in litigation management and alternative
dispute resolution are radical shifts in theories of the relative functions of judges and attorneys. In the classic model of the adversarial process, judges remain passive until the lawyers request their
assistance.1 1 The judges are like umpires, ruling on discrete issues
raised by the parties; individuals establish a dispute marketplace
where state intervention is necessary only when bargaining breaks
down.
The new model of the judge's role suggests that dispute resolution should not be left largely to attorneys and parties. Once the
state's power is invoked by filing a lawsuit, judges should actively
intervene in the administration of justice. 2 Judges, after all, are
expert dispute resolvers: as such they can analyze each dispute,
suggest the appropriate methodology for achieving an efficient and
Studies, 26 Soc. FORCES 408 (1948); Yin, The Case Study as a Serious Research Strategy, 3
KNOWLEDGE 97 (1981).
" In United States v. Michigan, the author served as a special master. In the Alabama
utility ratemaking cases, the author was asked by the Supreme Court of Alabama to design
a procedure for the use of an appellate expert. In the Ohio asbestos litigation, the author
and Professor Eric D. Green of Boston University School of Law were special masters.
1

See FLEMING JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1.2 (1965). In describing the traditional legal

process, Professor Chayes noted:
The process is party-initiatedand party-controlled.The case is organized and the issues defined by exchanges between the parties. Responsibility for fact development is
theirs. The trial judge is a neutral arbiter of their interactions who decides questions of
law only if they are put in issue by an appropriate move of a party.
Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1281, 1283
(1976); see also Frankel, The Searchfor Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1031,
1042 (1975).
" See Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a
Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 770, 770-71 (1981).
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fair resolution, and monitor the progress of conflicts to ensure that
additional intervention is not necessary.
This shift in perception concerning the judge's role arises out
of concern that traditional litigation is not functioning satisfactorily for courts, attorneys, parties, and society." Despite some evidence which shows that a dramatic reduction in case duration may
offset increases in the filing rate,14 there is a general perception of
judicial system overload. 15 Overworked judges must decide cases
hastily, attorneys are compelled both to make and to respond to
unjustified demands, parties pay for slower and more expensive decisions, and society suffers under more costly and less wise and legitimate "justice." Most commentators do not conclude that judges
are lazy, attorneys greedy, parties enamored of conflict, and society
masochistic. Rather, they argue either that people overuse the
courts or that traditional dispute resolution methods are obsolete;
proposed solutions then take the form either of limiting public use
of the judicial system or of making litigation more efficient.
The access limiters suggest increasing filing fees, reducing
substantive rights, 17 curbing jurisdiction,18 and lessening incentives
to bring suit.1 9 They often view the judicial process as a public
"3See id.; see also Rubin, The Managed Calendar: Some Pragmatic Suggestions
About Achieving the Just, Speedy, and Inexpensive Determinationof Civil Cases in Federal Courts, 4 JUST. Sys. J. 135 (1978); Schwarzer, Managing Civil Litigation: The Trial
Judge's Role, 61 JUDICATURE 400 (1978).
14 See Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know
(and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA
L. REv. 4, 36 (1983).

See, e.g., JETHRO LIEBERMAN, THE LrrmIous SOCmTY 8 (1981).
See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 132-36 (1985)
("Stiff fees .. .would tend to divert cases with small monetary stakes from the federal
court system to more suitable dispute-resolution processes, since a fixed user fee would constitute a higher percentage tax on such cases than on cases with larger stakes."); Cox,
Higher Fees Urged to Pay for Courts, DiscourageSuits: Economic Disincentives, L.A. Daily
J., Oct. 8, 1981, at 1, col. 2. But see Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access
Fees: The Right to Protect One's Rights (pt. 1), 1974 DUKE L.J. 527, 560-63 (suggesting
constitutional challenges to such fees).
17 See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 16, at 192-97; see also Reinhardt, Limiting Access to
the Federal Courts: Round Up the Usual Victims, 6 WHrrmR L. REv. 967 (1984).
" See, e.g., R. PosrN, supra note 16, at 139-47; see also Rowe, Abolishing Diversity
Jurisdiction:Positive Side Effects and Potentialfor FurtherReform, 92 HARv. L. REv. 963
(1979). But see Frank, The Case for Diversity Jurisdiction, 16 -HRv. J. ON LEGis. 403
(1979); Marsh, Diversity Jurisdiction: Scapegoat of Overcrowded Federal Courts, 48
BRooKLYN L. Rv. 197 (1982).
19 See, e.g., Comment, FinancialBarriers to Litigation: Attorney Fees and the Problem of Legal Access, 46 AL. L. REv. 148, 164-65 (1981) (suggesting that adoption of the

English rule for allocating costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees, would probably reduce
court congestion by penalizing frivolous claims and defenses); see also Rowe, The Legal
Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982 DuKE L.J. 651; Shavell, Suit,

The University of Chicago Law Review

[53:440

good and believe that ease of entry results in overuse. If filing fees,
for example, were increased substantially, the marketplace would
insure that only the more serious cases had access to the available
resources. Another suggested technique for reducing overload is
cutting down the number of legally recognized interests. Some
commentators have proposed that certain categories of cases, such
as personal injury suits, be decided by non-judicial tribunals 2 0 or
resolved in the marketplace through bargained-for insurance.2 1 In
the federal system, some propose easing crowded dockets by eliminating diversity jurisdiction. 2 Others suggest restricting awards of
attorneys' fees by imposing caps 23 or using the English system of
24
payment of costs.
Needless to say, the more extreme versions of access limitation 25 have met with less than universal acclaim. Proposals to
achieve more efficiency by reducing fundamental legal rights have
garnered particular criticism. If society chooses not to hear certain
types of cases, some costly effects might be created. 26

Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55 (1982).
20 See, e.g., Treiger, Relief for Asbestos Victims: A Legislative Analysis, 20 HARv.J. ON
179, 186-200 (1983) (discussing various bills introduced in Congress to provide for an
administrative remedy); Soble, A Proposalfor the Administrative Compensation of Victims
of Toxic Substance Pollution:A Model Act, 14 HARv. J. ON LEGIs. 683, 729-59 (1977).
21 See O'Connell, A "Neo No-Fault" Contract in Lieu of Tort: Preaccident Guarantees of Postaccident Settlement Offers, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 898 (1985). See also Professor
O'Connell's earlier articles, including Overcoming Legal Barriers to the Transfer of ThirdParty Tort Claims as a Means of Financing First-PartyNo-Fault Insurance, 58 WASH.
U.L.Q. 55 (1980) (with Beck), FinancingFirst-PartyNo-Fault Insurance by Assignment of
Third-Party Tort Claims, 1978 INS. L.J. 207, Harnessing the Liability Lottery: Elective
First-PartyNo-Fault InsuranceFinanced by Third-Party Tort Claims, 1978 WASH. U.L.Q.
693, and Contractingfor No-Fault Liability Insurance Covering Doctors and Hopitals, 36
MD. L. REV. 553 (1977).
22 See the articles cited supra note 18.
22 For a listing of judicially adopted contingent fee schedules and rules, see Rhein, JuLEGIS.

dicial Regulation of Contingent Fee Contracts, 48 J. Am L. & CoM. 151, 173 n.209 (1982).
Similarly, some jurisdictions have limited judgment amounts. See, e.g., Fein v. Permanente
Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368 (approving a $250,000 limit
on non-economic damages in medical malpractice suits), appeal dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 214
(1985); MONT.CODE ANN. § 27-1-221(6)(b) (1985) (limiting punitive damages in cases not
involving fraud or actual malice to the greater of $25,000 or 1% of the defendant's net
worth).
24 The English system is "winner take all": the loser has to pay the winner's reasonable
attorneys' fees. RICHARD JACKSON, THE MACHINERY OF JUSTICE: IN ENGLAND 518 (7th ed.
1977). For the practice in other European nations, see WERNER PFENNIGSTORF, LEGAL EXPENSE INSURANCE: THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE IN FINANCING LEGAL SERVICES

39 (1975).

See, e.g., Hager, Access to Justice: House Panel to Study Whether Courts are the
Best Place to Settle Many Disputes, 35 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1229, 1231-32 (1977).
28 See Fiss, supra note 7, at 1087-88; see also Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolu25
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Proponents of improving litigation efficiency suggest increas27
ing professionalism in judicial administration and management.
According to this view, judges can engage a broad range of skills
and tools to move the litigation pig through the judicial python.
They should not be restricted to traditional methods but should be
given substantial flexibility to design dispute resolution
procedures.
The Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) movement also has
its origins in dissatisfaction with current litigation.28 Supporters of
ADR suggest that disputants consider developing and using less
adversarial techniques to resolve their conflicts, and that potential
3 1 privatization,3 2
gains in efficiency, 29 quality,3 0 personalization,
and fairness 3 will result from using non-traditional dispute resolution: Panaceaor Anathema?, 99 HAmv. L. REV. 668, 677-78 (1986) ("But surely the mere
resolution of a dispute is not proof that the public interest has been served ....
[P]rivate
settlements are troubling when we have no assurance that the legislative- or agency-mandated standards have been followed, and when we have no satisfactory explanation as to
why there may have been a variance from the rule of law.") (discussing mediated settlement
of an environmental dispute).
As an example of costly effects, allowing equal protection challenges to discriminatory
actions arguably serves not merely to compensate the victims of discrimination. It also encourages minority group members to strive to break down the barriers of prejudice, by implicitly telling them that society views their efforts as desirable behavior. Without a remedy,
not only would the harm of discriminatory treatment remain uncompensated, but the implicit social acceptance of discrimination would discourage minorities from seeking to eradicate prejudice.
" See, e.g., Solomon, The Trainingof Court Managers, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 683; Stott,
The Judicial Executive: Toward Greater Congruence in an Emerging Profession, 7 JUST.
Sys. J. 152 (1982).
"a See Alternative Dispute Resolution, 29 VmL. L. REV. 1219 (1984); Alternatives to
Litigation, 48 ALB. L. REV. 569 (1984); see also Cover, Dispute Resolution: A Foreword, 88
YALE L.J. 910 (1979); Davis, A New Approach to Resolving Costly Litigation, 61 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'y 482 (1979); Edelman, InstitutionalizingDispute Resolution Alternatives, 9 JUST. Sys.
J. 134 (1984); Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute Settlement and
Rulemaking, 89 HARv. L. REV. 637 (1976); Staller, The Advantages of Alternative Dispute
Resolution in Tort Cases, 31 PRACTICAL LAW. 57 (1985).
20 See, e.g., Aksen, Arbitration of Automobile Accident Cases, 1 CONN. L. REv. 70, 7887 (1968) (suggesting that an arbitration program expedited payment of claims); see also
Note, California'sPilot Project in Economical Litigation, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1497 (1980).
3 See Cooke, The Highways and Byways of Dispute Resolution, 55 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
611, 631 (1981).
31 One criticism of using courts to resolve disputes is that "our court system often precludes direct participation by the principal parties to a dispute, relegating the tasks of communication and negotiation to lawyers and other advocates." Susskind & Madigan, New
Approaches to Resolving Disputes in the Public Sector, 9 JUST. Sys. J. 179, 179 (1984).
32 See Christensen, Private Justice: California's General Reference Procedure, 1982
AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 79, 84; Note, The CaliforniaRent-A-Judge Experiment: Constitutional and Policy Considerationsof Pay-As-You-Go Courts, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1592, 15991600 (1981).
21

See

INSTITUTE FOR CIV

JUSTICE, AN OVERVIEW OF THE FIRST FIVE PROGRAM

YEARS 36
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tion mechanisms.3 4 At the same time ADR proponents often stress
the behavioral weaknesses of lawyers as dispute managers.3 5 They
argue that attorneys are socialized to be procedurally adept, but
not to focus on the fundamental goals of legitimate dispute resolution." They are more intent on maximizing marginal gains by strategic manipulation of the adversarial process than in insuring that
those gains exceed the marginal costs of obtaining them. As a result, disputants receive both inefficient and unsatisfactory
"justice."
Both the judicial management and ADR movements posit a
model of litigation that deviates from the traditional paradigm of
two adversaries following defined rules and needing an official decision. Instead, they assume a great diversity of lawsuits reflecting
multiple degrees and causes of conflict, and believe that procedural
devices can be tailored to each dispute to foster fair and efficient
resolution.3 7 Both movements contend that our stylized adversarial
process is inappropriate in many cases. They note that adversarial
dispute resolution may solidify the public positions of parties
before they have had a genuine opportunity to explore their actual
interests. They suggest that disputants can often achieve better results by cooperating in developing information and in determining
a resolution,"8 or by employing a third party to find, or to assist the
parties to find, the underlying facts and an appropriate solution.3 9
(1983) (most participants in a court-annexed arbitration program in Pittsburgh believed the
outcomes to be fair).
34 For example, new devices, such as the mini-trial, involve the actual parties jointly in
a confirmation-sharing and decisionmaking process that can be relatively inexpensive and

yet result in an acceptable decision. See Davis, A New Approach to Resolving Costly Litigation, 61 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 482 (1979); Green, Marks & Olson, Settling Large Case Litiga-

tion: An Alternative Approach, 11 Loy. LAL. REv. 493 (1978).
35

Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43

OHIO

ST. L.J. 29, 43-51 (1982).

Id. at 48.
37 Proponents of ADR have suggested the concept of the "multidoor courthouse" where
a multitude of techniques would be available, depending upon the nature of the conflict and
36

characteristics of the participants. See S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, DISPUTE REsoLUTON 514-16 (1985); Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing,70 F.R.D. 111 (1976) (conceptual origins of the "multidoor courthouse").
38 "In virtually all cases, the solution that two parties can work out themselves, voluntarily, will be better than the solution that the most Solomonic court could come up with, as

the court is limited in the remedies that it can prescribe." Recent Developments in Alternative Forms of Dispute Resolutions (ADR), 100 F.R.D. 512, 514 (1983) (remarks of Professor

Eric D. Green).
39 See Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305 (1971). A

neutral third-party's assessment of a case may offer a more realistic prediction of the trial
outcome and may obviate each party's hesitancy to be the first to suggest settlement.
WAYNE BRAZIL, SETrLING CrviL Surrs: LMGATORS' VIEws ABOUT APPROPRIATE ROLES AND EFFECTIVE TECHNIQUES FOR FEDERAL JUDGES 44-46 (1985).
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By interjecting devices to encourage cooperation" or to find facts
more inquisitorially 41 (devices undervalued by existing procedure),
the courts, attorneys, and parties may be able to resolve conflict
more efficiently and fairly.
Both movements, then, rely upon a theory of dispute resolution that emphasizes flexibility and compromise. 4'2 That is not to
suggest that the existing system neglects compromise or that compromise is always appropriate; the current system is extremely successful in fostering settlement. Roughly 80 percent of cases filed in
the federal courts that receive some judicial treatment actually settle.43 The questions, for cases that are appropriate for settlement,
are whether litigation management and ADR can increase the percentage of those cases that are settled and reduce the time and
effort it takes to resolve them. If this can be done, some disputes
that currently require the scarcest resource-judicial trial
time-would be resolved by other means. This would free up court
time for more efficient allocation to the remaining unsettled cases.
Opposition to the management movement has been expressed
on two broad fronts: first, that the existing system works just
fine,'44 and second, that judicial intervention will precipitate a substantial loss in public values, particularly in the absence of any
principled mechanism for selecting alternative legal procedures.' 5
Opponents of ADR argue that its fundamental premises are either
unrealistic 46 or actively detrimental to society.47 Parties who have
4' See P.H. GULLIVER,
(1979).
41

DISPUTES AND NEGOTIATIONS: A CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 3-7

Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure,52 U. CHL L. REv. 823, 830-32

(1985).
42 R. Goldmann, Introduction to ROUNDTABLE JUSTICE: CASE STUDIES IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION 1, 2 (R. Goldmann ed. 1980).
43About 90% of all civil cases are settled privately, see Galanter, supra note 14, at 27,
but it must be noted that approximately one-half of all suits are terminated without any
court action. Statistics for 1983 show that in the federal district courts 42.4% of all terminations of diversity cases involved "No Court Action." ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
FEDERAL JUDICIAL WORKLOAD STATISTICS DURING THE TWELVE MONTH PERIOD ENDED DECEMBER

31, 1983, at A-25 (1984).
44 Cf. Edwards, supra note 26, at 671 (generally agreeing that new approaches to litiga-

tion are needed, but cautioning that using ADR procedures where public rights and duties
are involved may threaten our constitutional system).
5 See Fiss, supra note 7; Singer, Nonjudicial Dispute Resolution Mechanisms: The
Effects on Justicefor the Poor, 13 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 569, 574-76 (1979) (contending that
courts equalize power imbalances while ADR maintains relative power positions, thus favoring the "haves").
46 This position has been summarized as follows:
Some commentators, adopting an historical perspective, suggest that the present call
for reform is neither novel nor indicative of a real crisis, but is simply the most recent
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less power and society as a whole with its interest in the information that disputes generate will be disadvantaged by private dispute resolution. Powerful parties would not use these procedures
unless they redounded to their overall strategic advantage.
Some commentators criticize activist judges for using tactics
to stimulate settlement that are tantamount to coercion. Yet proponents of litigation management do not contend that any litigant
should be forced to settle or that any given case is susceptible to
settlement. 48 Rather, they believe that a large domain of cases is
suitable for and will benefit from intervention by judges, lawyers,
or parties.
The Manual for Complex Litigation Second supports judicial
assistance in tailoring procedures for complex cases. 49 The original
Manual for Complex Litigation was designed to supplement the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by prescribing strict guidelines
for managing complex cases. It advocated, for example, three
waves of discovery pursued sequentially in every case.5 0 The new
Manual, however, proposes a different management philosophy. It
contains a compendium of procedural devices, described in detail,
with comments concerning their strengths and weaknesses. 51 Each
recurrence of a cyclical pattern of popular dissatisfaction with institutions of justice,
which is particularly strong at present in light of increased expectations of the courts
and public institutions generally.
Bush, Dispute Resolution Alternatives and the Goals of Civil Justice:JurisdictionalPrinciples for Process Choice, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 893, 897; see also Cavanagh & Sarat, Thinking
About Courts: Toward and Beyond a Jurisprudence of Judicial Competence, 14 LAw &
Soc'y REv. 371, 375-76 (1980); Engel & Steele, Civil Cases and Society: Process and Order
in Civil Justice System, 1979 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 295, 346; Galanter, supra note 14,
at 49-51, 69-71; Trubek, Studying Courts in Context, 15 LAW & Soc'y REv. 485, 491 (1981).
47 See Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARv. L. REv. 374, 426-31 (1982) (threat to
impartiality).
4" For example, lawsuits involving differences in fundamental values are the least likely
candidates for alternative treatment. One commentator noted:
[T]here are some disputes that cannot be resolved simply by mutual agreement and
good faith. It is a fact of political life that many disputes reflect sharply contrasting
views about fundamental public values that can never be eliminated by techniques that
encourage disputants to "understand" each other ....
One essential function of law is
to reflect the public resolution of such irreconcilable differences; lawmakers are forced
to choose among these differing visions of the public good.
Edwards, supra note 26, at 678-79; see also Fiss, supra note 7, at 1082-85.
" MANUAL FOR CoMPLEX LIGATION, SECOND § 10 (1985).
80 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 0.50 (4th ed. 1977). Although one deviation from
this procedure is cited, the Manual warns that it "should not ordinarily be repeated."
"' For example, one section discusses the desirability of early issue identification and
the possibility of bifurcating trials or severing issues for trial. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LrrIGATION, SECOND § 21.632 (1985). Another explains how certain management tools have been
applied in specific contexts-antitrust, securities, mass torts. Id. § 33.1 (antitrust cases); id.
§ 33.2 (mass disasters and other complex torts); id. § 33.3 (securities litigation).
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individual judge or attorney must decide, on a case-by-case basis,
when intervention may be desirable and which techniques to use
*on which cases. This is a far cry from the original Manual's predetermined rules with universal applicability.
Judges or parties can diagnose the dispute, seek opportunities
for cooperation and inquisitorial intervention, tailor procedures to
enhance those opportunities, implement them, and monitor their
operation. Of course, distinguishing between cases that are and are
not appropriate for alternative treatment may be difficult. Other
objections may also be raised. The empirical evidence to date offers little support for the theory that judicial management or ADR
can reduce docket overload. Some limited studies even suggest that
case management and new techniques may have perverse effects on
efficiency. 52 Marginal changes made to deal with a much larger
problem may produce unsettling effects. 5 3 If we deviate from a generally accepted series of procedures, we may create new problems
that will undermine the legitimacy of the entire system. Thus, we
cannot know ex ante whether judicial management or ADR will
ameliorate docket overload.
My thesis is that we need principled methods for distinguishing among cases and that the difficulty and uncertainty of the task
should not inhibit experimentation-as long as that experimentation can be accomplished without abandoning shared concepts of
due process." We will make mistakes along the way; this is not a
risk-free enterprise. But the potential benefits-given the alternatives-appear to justify the endeavor.
B.

Descriptive Methodology
There is a general consensus that our courts are overloaded

52 "The effect of the usual procedural reforms . . . suggested . . . is to increase the
productivity of litigation expenditures. The relationship to delay is obscure. An increase in
the productivity of evidence will, as we have seen, induce litigants to purchase more of it."
Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedureand JudicialAdministration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 447 (1973).
53 For example, there may be problems in ensuring the accountability of the mediator,
see Susskind, Environmental Mediation and the Accountability Problem, 6 VT. L. REV. 1
(1981), or of creating or perpetuating an imbalance of power among the parties, see Lazerson, In the Halls of Justice, the Only Justice is in the Halls, in 1 THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE 119 (R. Abel ed. 1982); Nader, Disputing Without the Force of Law, 88 YALE
L.J. 998, 1019-20 (1979); cf. Fisher, Negotiating Power, 27 AK BEHAVIORAL ScIENTIsT 149
(1983) (assumes power imbalances, and suggests how a good negotiator manipulates them).
" See EXPERImENTATioN IN THE LAW: REPORT OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER ADVI-

SORY CoMMrrraE ON EXPERIMENTATION IN THE LAW (1981) (pointing out parallel concerns
and safeguards in human-subject experimentation by scientists and medical researchers).
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and that judicial intervention may be appropriate to guide cases
through the system. The most critical questions, however, are
when and how a judge or parties should intervene with nontraditional procedures. The mechanical aspects of prescribing management and alternative devices are relatively easy. The Manual Second contains a comprehensive exposition of ways to manage
litigation. In addition, numerous articles have suggested taxonomies of disputes and catalogued hosts of techniques to marry varieties of disputes to alternative procedures.5 5 As comprehensive as a
manual or taxonomy may be, however, none has accounted for the
full panoply of dispute variables. If courts or parties are going to
eschew standardized rules for handling cases, they need principles
from which to derive new procedures and a methodology for determining when and how to use them. This article suggests a process
which may help identify such principles and develop such a
methodology.
At first glance, deciding among procedural alternatives may
not appear to raise any complex policy issues. Yet procedures are
rarely value-neutral, whether or not we believe that they should be.
Any procedure-regardless of the nature of the underlying dispute
or the method by which procedures are applied-will affect the
outcome of a case.5 6 In the personal injury context, for example, it
may make a substantial difference whether all issues are tried together 57 and whether several cases are tried together.5 8 If a court
tries the entire case at once, the plaintiff probably gains from having the fact-finder hear evidence concerning both liability and

11 See, e.g., Fine, Moukad & Taylor, CPR Working Taxonomy of Alternative Legal
Processes(pt. I-IV), ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIGATION, May 1983, at 9, ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIGATION, Aug. 1983, at 4, ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST
OF LITIGATION, Nov. 1983, at 5, ALTERNATIVES TO THE HI-GH COST OF LITIGATION, Dec. 1983, at
5.
See, e.g., Comment, The Impact of Class Actions on Rule 10b-5, 38 U. CHL L. REV.
337, 345-65 (1971) (class actions restrict inquiry into issues involving the conduct of individual class members, such as reliance or in pari delicto, focusing instead on issues of strict
liability, such as materiality or the purchase-or-sale requirement).
57Bifurcation of the liability and damages issues can potentially prejudice a plaintiff
who is partially at fault by forcing him to prove the defendant's negligence twice, at both
the liability and the damages stages. Otherwise, he will recover only a token award of apportioned damages. It also can prejudice plaintiffs by reducing the effects of emotion on damage calculation. See Weinstein, Routine Bifurcationof Jury Negligence Trials:An Example
of the Questionable Use of Rule Making Power, 14 VAND. L. REv. 831, 831-32, 834-35 (1961).
58 This potentially confuses jurors because of their inability to isolate information on
individual plaintiffs. See Hasman v. G.D. Searle & Co., 106 F.R.D. 459, 460-61 (E.D. Mich.
1985) (refusing to consolidate the trials of three users of the Copper-7 I.U.D.).
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damages. Bifurcating the case probably favors the defendant;5 9
severing an issue such as general causation for separate trial definitely benefits the defendant.6 0 Likewise with consolidation: if the
cases of five or ten plaintiffs with the same alleged injuries are consolidated for trial, current wisdom suggests that the plaintiffs will
find it easier to prove liability.6 1 The effect of consolidation on
damages is less clear. Some experts believe that jurors will tend to
average damages, resulting in a lower overall verdict, whereas
others suggest that jurors may anchor on either the high or low end
of potential damages, resulting in a verdict either higher or lower
than an unconsolidated trial should produce.62
Since any procedural change affects the outcome of a lawsuit,
the question is whether the potential benefits from a change to
nontraditional procedures will outweigh the potential losses. Of
course, this calculation cannot be made with mathematical purity.
Neither efficiency analysis" nor a social welfare calculus6 4 alone
will be likely to further this process. We would have to make so
many assumptions to cope with uncertainty and with enigmatic
ramifications that the result would have been merely an illusion of
reality. 5 Perhaps a functional analysis of diagnosis and prescription is necessary to determine when and how alternative litigation
management would be appropriate. Such an analysis could provide
some consistency and rationality to decisions among procedural alternatives-permitting experimentation yet curbing the potential
6, Surveys have shown that personal injury defendants win a substantially greater proportion of bifurcated trials when the issue of liability is tried first than when the issues of
liability and damages are submitted at the same time. See Rosales v. Honda Motor Co., 726
F.2d 259, 261 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEmDERA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2390 (1971)) (percentage of defense victories rose from 42% to 79% by
bifurcation).
'o "There is a danger that bifurcation may deprive plaintiffs of their legitimate right to
place before the jury the circumstances and atmosphere of the entire cause of action...
replacing it with a sterile or laboratory atmosphere in which causation is parted from the
reality of the injury." In re Beverly Hills Fire Litigation, 695 F.2d 207, 217 (6th Cir. 1982)
(the first issue tried separately was whether "old technology" aluminum branch circuit wiring was the cause-in-fact of the fire).
61 See Kershaw v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 415 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir. 1969).
"2 Baker v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 11 F.R.D. 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
'3 See Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 HOFSsmA L. Rav. 485 (1980).
" See Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead. Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAw & Soc'Y Rav. 95, 149-51 (1974); see also Abel, Socializing the Legal
Profession: Can Redistributing Lawyers' Services Achieve Social Justice?, 1 LAw & POL'Y
Q. 5 (1979); Kidder, The End of the Road? Problems in the Analysis of Disputes, 15 LAW &
Soc'Y REv. 717 (1981).
'5 See, e.g., Markovits, Legal Analysis and the Economic Analysis of Allocative Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L. Rav. 811, 891-92 (1980).
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for ad hoc or unprincipled decisionmaking.
This descriptive analysis contains two parts: (1) identifying
candidates for alternative treatment and analyzing them to evaluate whether a given prescription of alternative procedures may be
worthwhile; and (2) examining the potential benefits and losses
from a prescribed alternative approach, and weighing them against
traditional approaches in light of established criteria for acceptable
legal process.
C.

Defining the Descriptive Analysis

1. Problem Identification and Diagnosis. Both inertia and
substantial startup costs are major deterrents to departing from
traditional procedures absent some compelling reason. These predominant incentives to remain with the status quo mean that only
cases identified as posing problems of sufficient magnitude win be
considered for alternative treatment.
What level of problems should there be before parties or
judges consider possible management alternatives? The guidelines
for making this decision generally are flexible-a set of criteria and
a standard to be met before proceeding. Many problems with litigation are expressed in terms of outcome:"6 parties question the
"wisdom" of the result. But since defining wisdom is so difficult,
most analyses tend to focus on the process of deciding rather than
the merits of the decision.
The criteria for determining the level to which a problem must
rise before intervention is appropriate are typically drawn from
due process values.8 7 It is far beyond the scope of this paper to
suggest a comprehensive standard of due process. 8 However, a
number of accepted criteria are useful in making procedural decisions. The following list of criteria is not meant to be exclusive or
all-inclusive; any decisionmaker may add or subtract at will.
There are interests in economy-the costs to the court, parProponents of abolishing the right to a jury trial in complex civil actions argue that
jurors cannot reach a "correct" decision because they are incapable of comprehending the
evidence. See, e.g., Comment, Complex Civil Litigation and the Seventh Amendment Right
to a Jury Trial, 51 U. CHL L. REV. 581, 582-83 (1984). Similarly, the debate on punitive
damages accelerated as the size of such awards increased. See Owen, Problems in Assessing
Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of Defective Products, 49 U. CHL L. REV. 1
(1982).
67 See generally Susskind & Weinstein, Towards a Theory of Environmental Dispute
Resolution, 9 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 311, 320 (1980-81).
6 See generally Francis E. McGovern, Measuring Procedural Change (1986) (unpublished manuscript).
66
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ties, and society in dollars and time, as well as in errors and opportunity. Much recent attention has been devoted to these concerns
and some sophisticated yardsticks have been created to measure
them. 9
Second, there are fairness interests-values of predictability,
rationality, and equality of opportunity and strategy.70 Arguably
decisions concerning legal process should be made ex ante, independent of the details of a given dispute.7 1 Thus the existence of
well-defined rules prior to a dispute would curtail the potential for
bias against a given party.
Finally, other substantive values concerning appropriate process have been identified-dignity, autonomy, participation, as
well as the values informing the applicable substantive law. Proponents of these criteria stress the behavioral side of the dispute resolution process and seek to optimize the effects of alternative procedures. 7 2 The criterion that the procedure should promote the
values of the applicable substantive law is more difficult to evaluate but is still an arguably important component to any due process analysis. Values in tort law such as deterrence, loss spreading,
efficient internalization of costs, punishment, and other behavioral
goals of the law are generally acknowledged as critical to any decisions concerning appropriate procedures in personal injury cases.3 3
Once parties or a court have applied their preferred criteria to
the problematic aspects of a pending dispute, it is possible to determine whether the perceived problem is related to legal process
or not. If the decisionmaker finds fault with traditional procedures
is high, the case may be
and the level of confidence in that decision
74
considered for alternative treatment.
6, See Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J. LAw & EcoN. 61 (1971);
Shavell, supra note 19; Trubeck, Sarat, Felstiner, Kritzer & Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation,31 UCLA L. REv. 72 (1983). See generally Posner, supra note 52 (postulating that the purpose of legal procedure is to minimize the sum of "error costs" and the
"direct costs" of operating the legal dispute-resolution machinery).
70 See J. THIBAUT & L. WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1975); Walker, Lind & Thibaut,
The Relation Between Procedural and Distributive Justice, 65 VA. L. REv. 1401 (1979).
71 See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
72 See JERRY MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 158-253 (1985);
Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U.L. REv.
885 (1981); Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Process-A Plea for "Process Values," 60 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1974).
73 See Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict ProductsLiability, 33 VAN. L. REv. 681
(1980).
74 Confidence in the need for alternative procedures should exceed a "preponderance of
the evidence" standard. The opportunity costs are sufficiently great that "clear and convincing" or "no reasonable persons would disagree" standards are more equitable. For an exam-
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2. Prescription.Next we must examine what impediments to
dispute resolution are created by existing procedures and what
more desirable procedural variations, if any, would alleviate the
problem. This phase of the descriptive analysis draws heavily upon
recent analyses of negotiation,7 5 which focus on locating opportunities for a bargained resolution to determine whether the potential
for compromise is genuine or ilusory.7 S Under one approach to negotiation, the decisionmakers examine at least three sets of variables to determine if a negotiated result is feasible: the appropriate
parties, the potential issues for discussion, and the information
sufficient to determine a resolution. Each of these variables is manipulable and can be organized or reorganized to enhance settlement potential. By examining the alternative mechanisms for dealing with parties, issues, and information, the decisionmaker can
estimate the probability that nontraditional litigation management
will bring about a more satisfactory outcome.
If a party desires to buy a plot of land, for example, but is
concerned about the future development of an adjacent parcel, the
buyer and seller may be unable to agree on a price because the
buyer is discounting the land's value by the probability of unwanted adjacent development. Adding a party may help: bringing
the owner of the adjacent parcel into the negotiations might lead
to a development plan for both parcels that would financially benefit all three parties.
Adding or subtracting issues may also assist in finding a negotiated result. Politicians intractably opposed on a given issue may
be able to resolve their differences by trading votes on additional
issues. Agreeing to disagree on certain issues while resolving others
is another example of how organizing issues may lead to negotiated
outcomes.
Finally, one can add information about values as well as facts.
Under so-called differences orientation, information concerning
fundamental values and how the parties view risk, time, and
probabilities of future outcomes may be critical in reaching a negotiated outcome. 7 If one party values an immediate return on capital and doubts that the future will bring significant profits, while
ple of the costs of alternative procedures, see infra nofes 155-57 and accompanying text.
76 JOHN CROSS, THE ECONOMICS OF BARGAUNG

(1965).

(1984); S. BACHARACH &
HowAD RAiFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION
(1982); ANATOL RAPOPORT, FIGHTS, GAMEs AND DEBATES (1960); J. RUBs & B.BROWN, THE
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF BARGAINING AND NEGOTIATION (1975).
7 See JAMES SEBENIUS, NEGOTIATING THE LAW OF THE SEA 114 (1984).
76 See, e.g.,

E.

ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION

LAWLER, BARGAINING

(1981);
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another party is willing to defer immediate payment in anticipa7
tion of future gains, they should be able to bargain. 1
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure already recognize these
variables. Joinder,7 9 consolidation,8 0 multi-district litigation, l class
actions,8s and third-party actions" all seek the most appropriate
combination of parties for adjudication. Issues can be reordered
through bifurcation,8 severance,8 5 interlocutory appeal,86 and certification. 7 Most courts use rules 16 and 2688 and various local
rules" to limit or expand discovery to insure that parties provide
information at an appropriate level and time.
3. Evaluating Proposed Alternative Procedures. The final
phase of the descriptive analysis involves examining a series of
comparative judgments using the defined due process criteria, such
as the previously suggested economy, fairness, and other substantive values. First, assess the potential benefits from using alternative procedures to solve the identified problem. Savings in time
and money, for example, as well as gains in dignity and participation can be roughly estimated. These benefits should then be discounted by the probability that they would not occur. Next, consider any negative externalities from using an alternative
methodology, discounted by the probability that they would not
occur. When changing a procedure that one party may have relied
upon, for example, take into account the chance of affecting the
equality of the process. Then, similarly calculate net benefits as75 Id. at 119 (presenting two examples: (1) sale of investment property-buyer believes
the price will rise while seller assumes it will drop, and (2) performer's contract when the
size of the potential audience is uncertain-performer, expecting a huge crowd, may accept
smaller guaranteed fee plus a percentage of the gate, which is acceptable to the promoter
who assumes a low turnout); see also id. at 132-33.
7' FED. R. Civ. P. 13(h).
:o FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a); 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1982).
81 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1982).
82 FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
3 FED. R. Civ. P. 14.
31 FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b).

:5

Id.

28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1982).
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)(A).
See, e.g., Flegal, Discovery Abuse: Causes, Effects, and Reform, 3 REv. LITIGATION 1,
39-47 (1982); Kaminsky, ProposedFederal Discovery Rules for Complex Civil Litigation,48
FORDHAM L. REV. 907, 912-13 (1980); Comment, Sanctions Under Amended Rule 26-Scalpel or Meat-ax? The 1983 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,46 OHIo
ST. L.J. 183 (1985).
as See Kahn, Local PretrialRules in Federal Court, 6 LITIGATMON, Spring 1980, at 34;
see also Flanders, Local Rules in FederalDistrict Courts: Usurpation,Legislation,or Information?, 14 Loy. LA.L. REv. 213, 227-29 (1981).
86

87
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suming the traditional procedure were used, and compare the results. If it appears that the alternative methodology is superior to
the existing system, intervention is appropriate.
To summarize, the "when" and "how" of alternative procedures can be decided by identifying the problem, diagnosing its
causes, devising techniques to vary the grouping of parties, issues,
and information, and weighing the relative merits of traditional
and nontraditional approaches using defined due process criteria.
In the event that some litigation management or ADR procedure is
employed, it should be carefully monitored with frequent feedback.
A significant imbalance in expectations might warrant a return to
old procedures. Finally, when the dispute has ended, the new process should be extensively evaluated. If society is to benefit from
novel approaches, we need full documentation of the procedure as
well as an objective analysis of its assets and weaknesses.
The discussion of the following three lawsuits illustrates this
descriptive analysis in practice.9 0 Each case contains at least one
procedural innovation which has been subject to some level of
evaluation.
II. ALLOCATION OF SCARCE RESOURCES: WHO OWNS THE GREAT
LAKES?

A.

Problem

In 1979 Judge Fox of the Eastern District of Michigan ruled
that the Treaty of 1836 between the United States and the Ottawa
and Chippewa peoples reserved to the tribes the right to fish in the
treaty waters of the Great Lakes unfettered by regulation by the
State of Michigan. 91 The U.S. Department of the Interior subse90 My editors and I engaged in a substantial debate regarding the use of the third person in the following case histories. They correctly point out that I may run the risk of deluding or confusing the reader concerning my role in these cases, or of appearing to take refuge
behind a facade of purported neutrality to my topic. On the other hand, it is my strong
feeling that the tone generated by the use of the first person suggests an imperial status that
is inconsistent with my perceived role as a cooperative participant in any dispute resolution
process. Over their objections, therefore, you will find me described as "special master,"
"professor," or "we" (when referring to actions taken in conjunction with another special
master) in the remainder of the article.
91 United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192 (W.D. Mich. 1979), remanded, 623 F.2d
448 (6th Cir. 1980), as modified, 653 F.2d 277, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1124 (1981). The progreis of the case after Judge Fox's original opinion is somewhat convoluted. The Sixth Circuit stayed his order on September 26, 1979, and remanded for consideration of the preemptive effect of new federal regulations. 623 F.2d at 449-50. Before the decision on remand
occurred, the regulations expired, and the State of Michigan filed an emergency motion with
the Sixth Circuit to set aside the remand order and to implement the state's new regulation.
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quently ceased regulating Great Lakes fishing, leaving two independent sovereigns to govern a common natural resource.92 The
tribal commercial fishers and other Michigan commercial and sport
fishers competed for fish in most of the Michigan waters of Lakes
Superior, Huron, and Michigan.
This competition triggered significant resource depletion and
violence among the competitors. In an attempt to save the basic
stocks of fish, the tribes, the state, and the United States agreed to
close the fishery each year as soon as a certain amount of fish had
been caught. As the competition increased, closure occurred earlier
and earlier each year, and the tribes took a smaller and smaller
percentage of the catch. The tribes could not compete technologically with the state commercial fishers, nor were they numerous
enough to compete with the burgeoning state sport fishers.9 3
As a result of the reduced catch and threats of violence, the
tribes moved Judge Fox's successor, Judge Enslen, to allocate the
treaty waters between the tribes and the state.9 4 A literal reading
of Judge Fox's original opinion supported the tribes' view that
they had a primary right to the resource and thus should be able to
take whatever fish were necessary to maintain reasonable tribal living standards. Given the tribes' depressed economic state, they
might obtain a virtual monopoly on Great Lakes fish stocks. The
State of Michigan countered that any allocation should be made on
See United States v. Michigan, 520 F. Supp. 207, 209-10 (W.D. Mich. 1981), aff'd, 712 F.2d
242 (6th Cir. 1983). The Sixth Circuit ruled that in the absence of federal regulation, the
State could regulate Indian fishing only if it met certain stringent criteria; the court retained the federal regulations as interim rules until modified by the district court. 653 F.2d
at 278-79. On remand, Judge Fox dismissed the action, noting that the preemption question
was moot, that the state had no intention of fulfilling the Sixth Circuit's criteria for regulation, and that the tribes had adopted as internal law the lapsed federal regulations. 520 F.
Supp. at 210-11 & n.4.
91 At the time of Judge Fox's ruling, the Indians fished under regulations promulgated
by the Secretary of the Interior in 1967, 25 C.F.R. § 256 (1968), and their own tribal regulations, enacted subject to Interior Department review. After the ruling was appealed and the
Sixth Circuit stayed Judge Fox's injunctions, the Secretary of the Interior promulgated a
new set of regulations, 44 FED. REG. 65,747 (1979), as amended, 45 FED. REG. 28,100 (1980)
(codified at 25 C.F.R. § 256 Subpart D (1981)), which were allowed to expire on May 11,
1981. See 520 F. Supp. at 209. The Secretary of the Interior retained the right to promulgate regulations, and the State of Michigan had the right to regulate the Indians if it could
make a proper showing. Id.; see supra note 91.
Il For background, see C. CLELAND & R. BISHOP, AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ECONOMIC
CONDITIONS OF THE BAY MILLS INDIAN COMMUNITY, SAULT ST. MARIE TRIBE OF CHIPPEWA INDIANS, AND GRAND TRAVERSE BAND OF OTrAWA AND CHIPPEWA INDIANS, AND A COST-RETURN

ANALYSIS OF TREATY COMMERCIAL FISHERMEN-1981

(1984). The Indians relied mainly on

gill nets which require only a small boat and almost no machinery.
" Indian Tribes' Amended Motion to Allocate Resource, United States v. Michigan,
Civil Action No. M26-73 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 25, 1984).
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equitable grounds, taking into account not only the tribes' subsistence needs but also how best to maximize the fishery's potential
economic benefits to all Michigan citizens. Because sports fishing
generated far more direct and indirect income than tribal fishing,
an economic analysis would tilt the scales toward control of the
fishery by Michigan sports fishers. The United States argued for a
50-50 split between the tribes and the state. The treaty itself contained little guidance for resolving the allocation issue.9 5
Given the paucity of precedent for any allocation scheme, the
parties' wildly differing approaches, the extreme volatility of the
situation, the complexity of any allocation process, and institutional weaknesses associated with continuing judicial management,
Judge Enslen decided that if allocation was appropriate, the parties preferably should do it.96 He also believed that an expeditious
decision was necessary to minimize the potential for violence in the
uncertain situation. Judge Enslen appointed a special master to
prepare the case for trial within eight months and explore the possibilities for settlement.9 7 The master's duties did not include ruling on substantive issues, and all his decisions were subject to de
novo review by the judge.
B.

Diagnosis

United States v. Michigan was relatively complex litigation;
the five named parties represented virtually all Michigan citizens.
The issues and information involved every conceivable problem associated with managing the largest lakes in the world. From one
perspective the case was a generic conflict-a distributional dis-

95

It provided only that "the Ottawa and Chippewa peoples shall have the right to fish

in the ceded waters until settlement." In the Treaty of March 28, 1836, the Indians retained
"the fishing grounds in front of such reservations [assigned to them]." 7 Stat. 491, 491

(1836). In a separate article, they "stipulate[d] for the right of hunting on the lands ceded,
with the other usual privileges of occupancy, until the land is required for settlement." Id.

at 495. In 1855, this treaty was modified as to the land to be held by the Indians. 11 Stat.
621 (1855).
In addition to the allocation problem, the Indians' use of gill nets necessitated interpretation of the treaties. This method of fishing was widely employed by the Indians when the
treaties were signed, and it was contended that the treaties entitled the tribes to use traditional means of fishing and hunting. The sportsmen objected because, unlike newer commercial fishing techniques, the nets ensnared both commercial and sports fish.
" Judge Enslen observed that "the public interest in a peaceful, and practically enforceable resolution of this matter mandates as preferable a resolution by settlement rather
than trial." Order of Reference 2, United States v. Michigan, Civil Action No. M26-73 (W.D.
Mich. Sept. 28, 1984).
97 Id. at 3.
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pute to divide a common pool among competing users.98 Large
numbers of equally situated parties, the fishers, had similar incentives to use a common asset, the Great Lakes, as much as possible.
Without intervention, the cumulative use would destroy the resource through massive overfishing. The essential problem was to
determine what kind of intervention would help to resolve the
dispute.
Under this view of the lawsuit, its big issues were polycentric,
not susceptible to the yes-or-no answers or mutually exclusive inquiries typical of special interrogatories posed to juries.9 9 The solution to any given question concerning resource division was dependent upon the solutions reached on the other questions: no issues
were independent. This complex interrelationship of issues created
difficulties which were compounded by the lack of any-much less
clear-legal standards. The court was being asked to make extremely complex management decisions by using policy differences
unreflected in the substantive law-"reasonable living standards,"
"subsistence," "maximizing value," and "equal distribution." Because of the continuing relationship among the parties, any courtimposed solution would probably generate future conflict. Even
under optimal conditions, changes in the resource itself would
breed future controversies.
Judge Enslen concluded that these characteristics begged for
an allocation plan developed by the parties themselves. It was a
classic case for integrative bargaining.110 The parties could identify
their respective interests, share information concerning how they
valued those interests, and reach for a combination of trade-offs
that would maximize each side's use of the resource. Under an eco98 See Ostrom & Ostrom, A Theory for Institutional Analysis of Common Pool
Problems, in MANAGING THE COMMONS 157 (G. Hardin & J. Baden eds. 1977); Edney, Paradox on the Commons: Scarcity and the Problems of Equality, 9 J. COMMUNrrY PSYCHOLOGY
3 (1981).

" See Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REv. 353, 394-404
(1978).
100 "An agreement is said to be more 'integrative' the greater its joint utility, that is,
the more valuable it is to the two bargainers taken together." Pruitt & Lewis, Development
of Integrative Solutions in Bilateral Negotiation, 31 J. PRSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY
621, 621 (1975). The concept has also been described as follows:
Integrative bargaining is the process whereby negotiators attempt to find a settlement
that reconciles or "integrates" the needs of both parties. [It] is feasible when the joint
payoff from a settlement is not constant across all possible settlements and the negotiators [cannot] initially [identify] a mutually acceptable settlement that will maximize
joint payoff.
Yukl, Malone, Hayslip & Pamin, The Effects of Time Pressureand Issue Settlement Order
on Integrative Bargaining,39 SocIoMrmY 277, 277 (1976).
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nomic analysis of integrative bargains, they could seek superior allocations, reduce conflicts of interest, and possibly achieve an optimal solution. 10 1 Given constraints on a court's ability to gather and
evaluate this type of information, the parties would be in a superior position to locate an optimal allocation plan. A party-developed plan would also eliminate any dislocation that could accompany a court-ordered resolution.
However, this diagnosis posed two major problems. First, the
parties asserted that the case involved fundamental political values
not subject to compromise. Leaders on both sides had invested
substantial political capital in their incompatible positions and had
constructed arguments slicing to the core of the relationship between two sovereigns in the United States.102 Second, these political leaders had attempted to achieve a negotiated resolution on numerous occasions over the years. Thus major behavioral
impediments had arisen from personal animosities and low expectations of reaching satisfactory agreement. 10 3 The tribal leaders, in
particular, had witnessed a long history of negotiation that had not
brought prosperity to their peoples. If the behavioral and valueladen components of the lawsuit predominated, judicial resolution
was almost inevitable.
C.

Prescription

Given the apparently great likelihood of a litigated resolution
but also significant potential benefits from negotiation, the master
implemented both prongs of the judge's order: preparing the case
for trial and assisting settlement efforts. Primary importance was
given to pretrial development. An expedited discovery schedule
was issued to ready the case for trial in four months.104 Because
massive amounts of information needed to be gathered, the sched101See J. SEBENIUS, supra note 77, at 115-16.
102 For a history of the conflict, see Robert Doherty, Troubled Waters: The Political
Economy of Treaty-Right Fishing in Michigan's Great Lakes (1985) (unpublished
manuscript).
los Several previous attempts to reach a negotiated resolution had failed. Talks begun
in early 1982 broke down when the parties could not agree on a plan for dividing rights in
Grand Traverse Bay; each side accused the other of bargaining in bad faith. After three days
of negotiation in August 1982, representatives of the state and the three fishing tribes
reached an agreement "in principle," but within a week the agreement began to break down
because of tensions between the representatives and their constituents. Again in 1983 there
were hopes of a negotiated solution, but the representatives were unable to draft a formal
document acceptable to the principals.
I"0Letter from Francis E. McGovern to Judge Richard A. Enslen (Jan. 31, 1985) (outlining discovery schedule) (copy on file with The University of Chicago Law Review).
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ule included several abbreviated forms of discovery and substantial
sharing of information.
The negotiation prong was more difficult-insuring that the
parties could reach agreement if they chose, without coercing them
into a settlement. The initial negotiation strategy borrowed from
final offer arbitration. 10 5 It contemplated that each party would
prepare an allocation scheme for the court. Since the special
master would meet ex parte to explore negotiation possibilities
with the parties and would thus discover their real interests (as
opposed to their litigation-generated positions), he would also recommend an allocation plan. Presumably his plan would be more
acceptable to all sides, and could be used either for negotiations or
as a mandated resolution to the dispute. Upon further analysis,
however, this strategy was fundamentally flawed: because the parties themselves would not develop the plan, its implementation
would have the same weaknesses as any court-ordered result. The
strategy was changed, therefore, to focus on assisting the parties to
develop their own allocation plans in accordance with classic integrative bargaining. This was a higher-risk strategy but, if successful, would have substantially more potential for legitimacy and
longevity.
The first task was to determine the likelihood of success for
any bargain at all. In conjunction with the Program on Negotiation
at Harvard, the master attempted to develop a scorable game that
would mimic the actual dispute. 106 The task involved identifying
each party's interests, selecting all feasible elements to any allocation plan, stating the parties' priorities, and determining the variety of systems that could be used to organize those interests and
elements. Each priority was then quantified in regard to each issue.
The negotiation theory applied to the game was so-called differ"' For general background, see Chelius & Dworkin, An Economic Analysis of FinalOffer Arbitration as a Conflict Resolution Device, 24 J. CoNFsucT RESOLUTION 293 (1980);
see also Farber, An Analysis of Final-Offer Arbitration, 24 J. CONFLIcT RESOLUTION 683
(1980).
10 The game was entitled "Lake Wasota Fishing Rights Game." "Games can sensitize
decision makers to unexpected outcomes while permitting complicated processes to be studied in controlled environments." HERBERT RUBIN, APPLIED SocIAL RESEARCH 236 (1983). For

discussions of the educational value of such games, see generally Bredemeier & Greenblat,
The Educational Effectiveness of Simulation Games: A Synthesis of Findings, 12 SIMuLATION & GAMES 307 (1981); Glenn, Gregg & Tipple, Using Role-Play Activities to Teach
Problem Solving: Three Teaching Strategies, 13 SIMULATION & GAMES 199 (1982); Hunsaker, Whitney & Hunsaker, Learning Negotiation Skills Through Simulation, 14 SIMULATION & GAMES 391 (1983).
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ences orientation. 107 For example, each party might value the same
portion of Lake Michigan differently. The tribes living in the
northern Michigan peninsula would probably prefer unlimited access to waters close to their homes. In contrast, the sports fishers
generally lived in southern Michigan and would value the southern
waters more highly. Differences orientation was particularly valuable here because of the economic and cultural disparities among
the parties: what appeared in the litigation context to be a major
problem of fundamental value differences was actually an asset in
developing a mutually acceptable allocation plan. Once relative
differences had been identified, they were entered into a computer.
A program was run to determine if any scenario would satisfy
each party's minimum priorities. When the game was limited to
the case's legal issues, no negotiated outcome seemed possible. If,
however, the issues were expanded to include other items that
might be subject to negotiation, some solutions might satisfy the
hypothetical minimum interests of the parties. A court, for example, was limited to interpreting the treaty in perpetuity; an agreement by the parties could be for a term of years. A negotiated disposition, unlike a typical court decision, could also include
provisions for plantings of fish, monetary payments, and market
development. When these and other issues were added to the computer, there emerged combinations of components which indicated
different possible solutions where agreement was feasible.
As originally designed, the scorable game had another, more
important function. Its primary purpose was as an educational
tool, not just to provide specific answers, but to teach the parties
how to negotiate. If all of the key decisionmakers could play the
game, typically separately, they might better appreciate their own
and their adversaries' positions. Moreover, they might develop
more confidence in their own abilities and power as negotiators.
The negotiation prong thus became an educational and behavioral
task, aimed at educating the parties concerning the potential for
maximizing their own interests, developing their strategic negotiating capacity, expanding the roster of issues subject to bargaining,
and softening communication and behavioral barriers to face-toface negotiation.
1. Parties.The plaintiffs consisted of three Indian tribes and
the United States; the defendant was the State of Michigan. The
tribes had extremely varying interests: one tribe desired to perpet107

See J. SEBENIUS, supra note 77, at 113-81.
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uate the traditional cultural values of Indian fishing, another desired to maximize the tribes' overall economic benefit, and the
third valued accommodation consistent with limited tribal fishing
in one area of Lake Michigan. The United States represented the
tribal interests and the concerns of the Fish and Wildlife Service
in restoring the Great Lakes to their earlier economic prosperity-goals that were not always consistent.
The State of Michigan also represented competing interests:
those of state commercial fishers, the developing sports fishing and
tourist industry, Indian citizens of Michigan living outside the reservations, and the public peace. The state's prime mover was its
Department of Natural Resources, but the organized commercial
and sports fishers were independent, politically powerful constituents. Judge Enslen decided, therefore, to bring these groups of
state fishers into the litigation, but without full party status. He
named them litigating amici: 1 8 they had a participatory role in
discovery and at trial, but could not veto a potential settlement.
This innovative organization of parties ensured that all the key
decisionmakers were present in the litigation.
The court then assigned the special master to mediate among
the named parties and the litigating amici. Because the case would
eventually be tried to the judge, his ability to facilitate negotiation
was limited by his strong ethical constraints against prejudging the
outcome of the case. Therefore, the master performed this role
while insulating the judge from the details of any bargaining. As a
part of the mediation role, the master also kept the parties' critical
decisionmakers aware of the progress of the litigation and the negotiations. He met with the leaders and sometimes virtually all the
members of the tribes, officials of the U.S. Department of the Interior, and Michigan's Governor, Attorney General, and the Director
of its Department of Natural Resources.
2. Issues. The issues were both simplified and expanded. The
resource allocation was narrowed to involve five major variables:
species of fish, quantity of fish, fishing gear, geography, and time.
Even with this gross simplification, a virtually infinite number of
combinations of variables and numerous measuring criteria still remained. The parties were asked to narrow these issues further by
proposing management plans that they would support at trial.
lo8 The litigating amici were the Michigan United Conservation Clubs, the Grand
Traverse Area Sport Fishing Association, the Michigan Steelhead and Salmon Fishermen's
Association, the Michigan Charter Boat Association, and a large group of individually
named, state-licensed commercial fisherman.
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Timing became important in setting the deadlines for identifying
plans, because a party might lock itself into a given negotiating
posture by solidifying behind a single management plan.
While the parties were narrowing issues, an intensive educational effort was undertaken to broaden the horizons to include additional issues suitable for negotiation. All the parties were questioned in great detail concerning their interests-some totally
unrelated to the case-to see if they might be interested in placing
them on the bargaining table.
3. Information. Normal discovery had been expedited somewhat by the parties' agreement to pool data concerning Great
Lakes fishing. A tripartite group of biologists from the tribes, the
state, and the United States had cooperated in developing consensus recommendations based upon shared information. 10 9 In addition, the tribes turned over all of their fish catch reports to the
state so that the data could be computerized and made available to
everyone.
Early in the lawsuit it had appeared that disagreements
among the biologists would constitute a major portion of the evidence during trial. Some thought was given to appointing an expert to assist in resolving scientific issues. Because the biologists
were cooperating in some areas, however, they were asked if they
could develop a joint computer model of the five critical variables.
If this could be done, computer runs could be made for each suggested management plan to determine the effects of that plan on
these variables. A neutral expert. in modeling was asked to assist
the biologists and the special master in creating the computer
model.
This process has been called computer-assisted negotiation. 110
Experts attempt to create a consensus model of a complex phenomenon that will, in effect, constitute a negotiated dispute resolution or enable the policymakers to negotiate a result. The created
model then scrutinizes hypothetical solutions to verify that any
chosen solution can meet parties' expectations.
'09 See Status of the Fishery Resource-1984, A Report by the Tripartite Technical
Working Group on the Assessment of Major Fish Stocks in Treaty Ceded Waters of the
Upper Great Lakes: State of Michigan (the three parties were the Great Lakes Fishery Laboratory of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service of the U.S. Department of the Interior, the Fisheries Division of the Michigan Department of Natural Resources, and the
Chippewa/Ottawa Treaty Fishery Management Authority) (copy available from the author).
110 See generally Sebenius, The Computer as Mediator:Law of the Sea and Beyond, 1
J. POL'Y AN~AYsis & MGMT. 77 (1981) (computer models can "foster learning, help define the
negotiating agenda, stimulate communication, and suggest joint gains").
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In this situation the computer-assisted negotiation was enormously successful, but for a different reason. Negotiations over the
model soon revealed that the biologists were generally in agreement, except in areas of massive uncertainty or where basic policy
choices were involved. Thus the major by-product of developing
this model was to resolve most of the case's biological issues.
Finally, information was added to the lawsuit concerning parallel litigation over Indian salmon fishing rights in the Pacific
Northwest. In United States v. Washington,"' various tribes won
a share of the Washington salmon catch. The parties had declined
to negotiate a solution to their allocation dilemma, and years of
intense litigation ensued. 112 Representatives of several parties to
that case were invited to speak to the participants in United
States v. Michigan concerning the court's management of their resource. They reported in detail how the court made decisions-even on a fish-by-fish basis-and how fishery managers and
fishers coped with these decisions. They also recounted some of the
spillovers to tribal relations that had developed out of the case.
They generally recommended that a negotiated management
plan-if feasible-was preferable to a litigated one. 1
D.

Results

After three days of negotiations the parties reached a settlement on March 28, four weeks before the scheduled trial.11 4 The
settlement agreement closely paralleled one of the scorable game
"I See United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd, 520
F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976); see also Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
' For general discussion of the Washington litigation, see Schmidhauser, The Struggle for Cultural Survival: The Fishing Rights of the Treaty Tribes of the Pacific Northwest, 52 NoTRE DAmE LAW. 30 (1976); Note, Treaties: Fishing Rights in the Pacific Northwest-The Supreme Court "Legislates" an Equitable Solution, 8 AM INDLtN L. REV. 117
(1980); see also Landau, Empty Victories: Indian Treaty Fishing Rights in the Pacific
Northwest, 10 ENvrL. L. 413 (1980); Comment, Indian Treaty Analysis and Off-Reservation
Fishing Rights: A Case Study, 51 WASH. L. REV. 61 (1975); Note, United States v. Washington (Phase II): The Indian Fishing Conflict Moves Upstream, 12 ENVTL. L. 469 (1982);
Note, United States v. Washington: Implied Treaty Rights to Continue Fishing, 18 WILLAmET
L. REV. 659 (1982).
11 One of the persons speaking on the Washington experience was George Dysart. In a
paper presented several years earlier, Mr. Dysart described the disadvantages of relying on a
judicial solution to fisheries management. George Dysart, The Boldt Case and Fishing in the
Northwest 15-17 (paper presented to National Council for the Social Studies, 59th Annual
Meeting, Portland, Oregon, Nov. 23, 1979).
1"
See Arthurs, Master Lands Settlement That Almost Got Away, Legal Times, Apr.
22, 1985, at 1, col. 2.
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solutions that indicated possible areas of compromise. The court
approved the settlement, but one of the tribes overruled its leaders
on a subsequent 31-29 vote and decided to proceed with the litigation. 115 All the other parties ratified the negotiated agreement. The
judge severed the two alternative management plans for trial, conducted a trial, and ruled on the merits in favor of the negotiated
16
plan.
Insufficient time has passed to evaluate the success or failure
of the negotiated plan. No one appealed the judge's ruling, no subsequent violence has occurred in the lakes, and the policymakers of
each of the parties are jointly managing the resource. Most remarkable of all is the agreement's longevity even though one of
three tribes rejected it. Given a long history of solidarity among
the tribes in this lawsuit, it was almost inconceivable that an alliance among two tribes, the state, and the United States could
withstand the pressures of one tribe's dissent.
But significant problems still remain in implementing the
agreement. The lines of authority for managing the fish are not
clear, there are dislocation problems in certain geographical areas,
and the funds provided by the agreement have not been allocated
among the tribes."" The parties agreed upon an ADR process, so
that the court can resolve any outstanding issues without full
trial."8 No disputes have yet risen to a level requiring judicial
intervention.
1. Economy. The court has requested the special master to
evaluate the trial preparation and settlement process, and a report
should issue after the next fishing season. Any evaluation will be
extremely difficult to accomplish. An economic analysis suggests

"' United States v. Michigan, File No. M26-73CA (W.D. Mich. Apr. 10, 1985) (Consent
Order). In addition to the 31 votes for rejection and 29 votes for acceptance, there were 13
abstentions. Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, submitted by Bay Mills
Indian Community, at 9-10, United States v. Michigan, File No. M26-73CA (W.D. Mich.
May 14, 1985). On May 4, 1985, a General Council meeting was called to reconsider the
rejection; the vote was 139 opposed, 61 in favor, and 4 abstentions. Id.
116 Pre-Trial Order in Bifurcated Allocation Trial, United States v. Michigan, File No.
M26-73CA (W.D. Mich. May 7, 1985).
1
For example, one tribe expressed concerns over the possible discontinuance of the
tribal conservation program and allocation among the tribes of $180,000 provided for under
paragraph 43(b) of the Agreement for Entry of Consent Order. Letter of Joseph K. Lumsden to Executive Committee of the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians (Sept. 25,
1985) (copy on file with The University of Chicago Law Review).
"0 The mechanism is called "U.S. v. Michigan Dispute Resolution Mechanism." It has
been described as "a barebones alternative to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." ADR
Mechanism Set Up in Great Lakes Fishing Case, ALTERNATVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LrrIGATION,

Feb. 1986, at 5, 5.
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that the direct expenses were significant-approximately $200,000
for master, experts, and expenses.1 19 Attorneys for the parties
worked almost full-time on the case from January to March and
during May of 1985. Policy leaders and support personnel were
also substantially involved during this time. Yet most of these expenses would have been incurred in traditional litigation. The cost
to the court in time and money was minimal: only four conferences
and a four-day trial. None of the master's rulings was appealed to
the court. On balance there was a trade-off between identifiable
additional expenses associated with the master's work and unidentifiable savings because of the expedited trial preparation process
and the abbreviated trial.
Error and opportunity costs are also difficult to ascertain. All
of the parties except for the dissident tribe apparently felt that the
outcome minimized their perceived concerns about errors in a
court-ordered allocation plan. Given the litigation's twelve-year
history and expectations that it would continue indefinitely, settlement was greatly beneficial in that it allowed the parties to devote
their energies to other productive endeavors. But the dissenting
tribe felt that they failed to achieve their expectations and that
their treaty rights had been reduced. 120 Some concern was expressed that the trial's posture had benefited the majority at the
expense of the lone dissenter. As the court's opinion indicates,
however, strong support existed for the merits of the negotiated
12
agreement as opposed to the dissenters' management plan. 1
2. Fairness. The fairness criteria seemed generally satisfied
for all except the dissident tribe, but their concerns seemed to relate more to internal leadership policies than to the trial preparation and settlement process. The parties had negotiated the discovery schedule, which was memorialized in a pretrial order. The
negotiation dates had been determined far in advance, and all parties seemed well prepared to present their positions. On the other
hand, the attorneys' time resources had been spread extremely
thin during trial and negotiation. Arguably, the state suffered some
disadvantage because of the critical role played by one attorney

"I Expenses

were itemized in "Reports of Activities of Special Master" filed with the

court periodically during the period from September 28, 1984 through May 14, 1985. The
author's compensation and expenses were over $100,000, while out-of-pocket expenses and
the fees of two independent experts totalled over $73,000.
120 See Proposed Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law and Pretrial Brief of Bay
Mills Indian Community, United States v. Michigan, File No. M26-73CA (W.D. Mich. May
14, 1985).
"I See supra note 115.
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and the short time it had to respond to the final tribal allocation
22
plan.

1

3. Other Values. The negotiations themselves afforded significant opportunity for maximizing the values of dignity, autonomy,
and participation. They took place in Sault Ste. Marie, near the
homes of most tribal members; over fifty people were invited to
participate. 23 Media representatives were present for virtually the
entire three-day period, although they did not attend the actual
negotiations.
Because of the multiplicity of issues that would be contained
in any allocation plan and the numerous individuals present in
Sault Ste. Marie, negotiations were bifurcated into two separate
efforts. Although everyone who desired to participate could do so,
the smaller negotiating session was reserved for the named parties,
and it coped with the more critical issues.
There was a conscious effort to avoid coercing the parties. The
judge attended the opening negotiation session but left soon thereafter. The special master coordinated and facilitated the discussions but never suggested that one outcome was preferable to another. The master's most active intervention was to remind the
policy leaders that they had a limited time to determine whether
they wanted settlement or trial.
Were the deviations from the traditional trial model-the special master, scorable game, abbreviated discovery schedule, computer-assisted negotiations, and presentation from United States
v. Washington-justified? Would the parties have settled anyway?
Was the settlement "better" than an adjudicated outcome? Given
the stated criteria, an ex post analysis suggests that the intervention was worthwhile. Ex ante, however, with the extremely high
risk of no settlement, the answers are less clear.
III.

SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL DIsPuTEs:
FREEZE IN THE DARK?

WILL

PEOPLE

A. Problem
During and after the energy crunch of 1973-74 and the high
inflation and interest rates in the late 1970s, public utilities repeatedly sought rate relief from the various state utility ratemaking
commissions. 124 In Alabama, a Public Service Commission (PSC)
122 See Arthurs, supra note 114, at 1, col. 2.
123

Id.

12 "Rapid inflation had quickly changed a very passive and inactive 'rate of return'

19861

Managing Complex Litigation

composed of three individuals elected statewide established utility
12 5
rates subject to direct appeal to the Alabama Supreme Court.
Hearings before the PSC were noted for widely divergent testimony on scientific, technical, economic, and accounting issues,
sprinkled with a high level of emotionalism. Utility ratemaking was
probably the most volatile political issue in Alabama during this
period.1 26 It was not uncommon for witnesses to testify literally
127
that "people will freeze in the dark" unless rates were reduced.
Utilities countered that industrial development in the state would
come to a standstill without money to expand energy generation.
The chairman of the Alabama PSC even offered to debate the
chief justice of the Alabama Supreme Court on television
to re128
levels.
rate
utility
appropriate
over
solve the conflict
Since the record on appeal consisted of transcripts of the PSC
hearings, the supreme court often received evidence that was extremely difficult to assimilate, both because of its highly technical
nature and because of the confusion and disagreement among the
experts, even on fundamental premises underlying their testimony.
The court's opinions reflected its problems in handling these cases;
there was unease in engaging the underlying issues, and critical deregulatory process into a very active and continual process of administrative rate of return
review." Joskow, Inflation and Environmental Concern: Structural Change in the Process
of Public Utility Price Regulation, 17 J.L. & EcoN. 291, 314 (1974) (emphasis deleted).
215 ALA. CODE § 37-1-1 et seq. (1975 & Supp. 1985). Prior to 1978, the initial appeal
from orders of the Public Service Commission was to the circuit court for Montgomery
County, see ALA. CODE § 37-1-120 (1975), with further right of appeal to the Supreme Court
of Alabama, see ALA. CODE § 37-1-132 (1975). Since 1978, there has been only a direct appeal to the supreme court. ALA. CODE § 37-1-140 (Supp. 1985). The revision was passed by
the legislature with almost no opposition. The change was agreed to by all parties involved
in the utility ratemaking process as a time-saving measure since unsuccessful parties at the
circuit court level almost always appealed the decision, and the proceedings before the supreme court were in effect de novo because no presumptive weight was given the trial
court's ruling. See Osborne Truck Lines v. Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 284 Ala. 166, 168,
223 So. 2d 284, 286 (1969).
114 In a study of utility regulatory bodies, the Alabama PSC was characterized "as a
panel whose decision are based on members' political ambitions, rather than on facts." Kovacs & Bailey, Investors Give PSC Low Marks, Birmingham News, Jan. 25, 1982, at 1A, col.
1. Commissioners convey to the public images of "white knights fighting the rich utilities
and moneyed, out-of-state investors who own their stock." Id.
127 The Attorney General intervened as a representative of the consumers and argued
that utility rates were too high. At one point, several low- and fixed-income individuals,
represented by Legal Services attorneys, intervened and testified at the PSC hearings that
they were having to choose between eating and paying their power bill.
"' Before a civic group, Billy Joe Camp, then president of the PSC, stated: "I'll defend
these (PSC decisions) anywhere, anytime with anybody, with either one member of the [supreme] court or all nine, with one person from the power company or with them all." Taylor, Let PSC set utility rates or abolish it, Camp says, Birmingham News, Oct. 21, 1981, at
2A, col. 1.
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cisions often turned on conclusory normative statements, creative
fictions, or procedural niceties such as standards of review or burdens of proof.129 Concern was expressed that some justices were
inclined to go outside the record to find scientific support for their
opinions. 13 0
Members of the supreme court were concerned about the perceived legitimacy of their decisions in these cases because they
lacked confidence in their ability to address the merits of these
complex technical disputes. 3 ' The frequency and intensity of appeals and the public statements by the interested utility ratemaking constituency confirmed that the court was having difficulty in
providing rational predictability in its decisionmaking processes.
B.

Diagnosis

An initial diagnosis of these disputes suggested that both institutional and strategic components underlay the court's
problems. The parties were apparently convinced that the outcome
of PSC hearings would be governed by political concerns rather
than by the economic or accounting aspects of utility ratemaking.
The evidence they presented before the PSC tended to reflect political posturing supported by tenuous expert testimony. The parties also believed that each case would be appealed to the supreme
court, and that the court would decide the constitutional issue of
confiscation by independently reviewing the evidence presented to
the PSC. Yet the parties had little confidence that the court could
handle the economic and accounting issues. Rather, they expected
the court to fail to sort out difficult scientific and technical issues
and to render its decisions on other grounds.
The parties' strategy was to emphasize the arguments on basic

'19 For example, when Alabama Power Company sought a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Alabama of a PSC ruling on the treatment of advertising cost as a rate base
item, the court avoided the substantive issue on jurisdictional grounds. APC loses bid in
court, but won't give up fight, Birmingham News, May 10, 1981, at 29A, col. 1.
130 This concern surfaces in many contexts. See, e.g., United States v. 1,078.27 Acres of
Land, 446 F.2d 1030, 1034 (5th Cir. 1971) ("A major risk when the trial judge resorts to
outside sources to verify facts is that he may choose to decide the whole dispute on the basis
of his own independent research."), cert. denied sub nom. Galveston City Co. v. United
States, 405 U.S. 936 (1972).
'31 "The lack of a sound factual base in promulgating general norms raises the question
of legitimacy." Miller & Barron, The Supreme Court, the Adversary System, and the Flow
of Information to the Justices:A PreliminaryInquiry, 61 VA. L. REv. 1187, 1228 (1975). See
generally PHrLIP B. KuRLAD, POLrTICS, THE CONsTTruTION, AND THE WARREN COURT 170-206,
196 (1970) ("The Court, because it is a court, lacks machinery for gathering the wide range

of facts and opinions that should inform the judgment of a prime policy-maker.").
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value judgments and to present economic and accounting evidence
only insofar as it supported the political positions. This polarized
the scientific and technical expertise, so that the record contained
economic and accounting testimony at the extremes of the distribution of scientifically acceptable evidence. Thus, the parties
rarely joined issue on the economic and accounting evidence, and
the court never heard information from the center of the evidentiary spectrum. The adversarial process had so polarized the parties' positions that the court was almost forced to choose between
unacceptable alternatives; it was final offer arbitration run
L3 2
amok.
Compromise was not a feasible alternative. The PSC, the various consumer groups, and their supporting politicians had invested
so much political capital in their positions that any wavering would
appear to be defeat. Utilities generally felt compelled to stake out
a correspondingly strident position in order to protect their future
customers and shareholders. The parties' public positions suggested that they would prefer presenting and arguing their cases
more on the merits but felt trapped in their current strategy.1 33
Therefore, the task in developing an alternative procedure would
be to create incentives for the parties to present clear and comprehensive testimony in the center of the acceptable evidentiary spectrum and then join issue on that evidence, without removing the
proceedings from the adversarial process or diluting the role of the
supreme court.
When the Alabama legislature passed the statute providing for
direct appeal from the PSC to the supreme court, the chief justice
added a provision allowing the court to hire an expert to assist its
decisionmaking.I3 4 The chief justice then requested a law professor
to develop an appellate procedure for the court to employ experts.
'1 See supra note 105. This form of arbitration is currently being used in professional
baseball to resolve salary disputes. See Grebey, Another Look at Baseball's Salary Arbitration, 38 ARB. J., Dec. 1983, at 24; Miller, Arbitrationof Baseball Salaries:ImpartialAdjudication in Place of Management Fiat, 38 ARBITRATION J., Dec. 1983, at 31.
,33 For example, while Attorney General Charles Graddick employed experts to review
Alabama Power Company's rate requests and to testify at PSC proceedings, he was still
compelled to make public statements attacking the utility and its behavior. Holmes, Opponents will line up to halt rate hike request, Birmingham News, March 22, 1981, at 11A, col.
2 ("Historically, Alabama Power Co. makes rate requests that are far greater than they

need.").
'34 See ALA. CODE

§ 37-1-143 (Supp. 1985).
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Prescription

The addition of an inquisitorial element in the form of an expert seemed appropriate to accomplish these tasks. It would be
necessary, however, to devise a procedure that would be acceptable
to the parties and their attorneys while providing sufficient guidance to the court. After extensive meetings with virtually all interested persons, the professor drafted rule 33A of the Alabama Rules
of Appellate Procedure to govern the use of an appellate expert in
utility ratemaking cases. 3M The theory behind rule 33A was that
the expert's mere presence would alter the parties' strategies and
encourage them to present more digestible information to the
court. If the court could recognize when evidence was drawn from
the tails of a distribution of acceptable economic and accounting
information, it could discount that evidence accordingly. Realizing
this, the parties should present more generally accepted testimony
in a clear and comprehensive fashion. The chances would correspondingly increase that parties would actually join issue on disputed matters. Then the court could more easily engage these issues in a reasoned fashion. If the theory were correct, the court
might not even need to appoint an appellate expert; the mere
threat would suffice to accomplish this goal.
1. Parties.The rule 33A endeavor added two new players: a
creator of the process and an appellate expert on economic and
accounting issues. Drafting the new procedural rule was accomplished over a six-month period and involved participation by virtually every party or attorney who expressed an interest in utility
ratemaking proceedings. It culminated in a vote of approval by the
Advisory Committee on the Alabama Rules of Appellate
Procedure. 3 6
The rule provides that an appellate expert in each case is selected from a list provided by the parties and the court.13 7 First the
court narrows the list of candidates to three; then the appellants
and appellees each have one strike; the remaining person is the
appellate expert for that case. In the initial version of the rule, no
oral communication was permitted between the expert and the
court or the expert and the parties.3 8' The expert would respond in
,5 ALA. R. App. P. 33A.
M36
The rule was drafted by the Alabama Appellate Rules Committee with the assistance of the author and became effective on March 6, 1981, after approval by the Alabama
Supreme Court. Id. 33A.
137 Id. 33A(b)(1). If the parties agree on a particular expert he will be appointed. Id.
Id. 33A(b)(2) & (c)(3).
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writing to inquiries addressed by the court and made available to
the parties. 3M The parties would also receive the expert's responses, so that they might object or raise additional issues. 140 The
appellate expert would not report conclusions on any ultimate issues, but would assist the court in coping with the evidence con14 1
tained in the record on appeal.
By sharply limiting the expert's function, forbidding ex parte
communication, and including strict ethical standards, there was a
consensus that most of the traditional objections to court-appointed experts had been overcome.1 42 The selection process and
method of communication were also designed to foster the use of
experts who had previously refrained from testifying in an adversarial proceeding out of a distaste for cross-examination.
2. Issues. Since the expert could not go outside the appellate
record or decide ultimate issues, there was little potential for issue
expansion. The rule's goal was just the opposite-to narrow the
issues. Just as a law clerk takes the record and a mass of briefs and
organizes a bench memorandum, the expert could organize and
summarize the economic and accounting evidence. The court
could, for example, list the legal issues in the case and request the
appellate expert to organize the evidence that each side had
presented on each issue. The expert's response might include the
critical economic or accounting subissues under each legal issue indicating where joinder had or had not occurred.
The importance of issue definition by the appellate expert
should not be underestimated, however. Recent work in agenda
theory illustrates that issue framing and issue sequencing can be
critical.1 43 Often the major dispute in a case is over the issues to be
decided, either at the factual or legal level.144 With this in mind,
multiple safeguards were designed into the rule to constrain the
Id. 33A(c).
Id. 33A(d).
141 Id. 33A(c)(5).
142 See, e.g., FED. R. Evw. 706 Advisory Comm. notes; Botter, The Court-Appointed
Impartial Expert, in USING EXPERTS IN CIvu, CASES 53 (M. Kraft 2d ed. 1982); see also
Sheppard, Court Witnesses-A Desirable or UndesirableEncroachment on the Adversary
System?, 56 AUSTRL. L.J. 234 (1982). On the particular dangers posed by ex parte communications, see Brazil, Special Masters in Complex Cases: Extending the Judiciary or Reshaping Adjudication?, 53 U. CHL L. REV. 394, 421-22 (1986).
1 See Levine & Plott, Agenda Influence and Its Implications, 63 VA. L. RE V. 561
(1977); Plott & Levine, A Model of Agenda Influence on Committee Decisions, 68 AM.
130
140

EcoN. REv. 146 (1978).
144

See P. GuL.IvER, supra note 40, at 126-27.
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expert's power in this task. 145
3. Information. As with the issues, the appellate expert
would not supplement existing testimony but would merely identify economic and accounting information and enable the court to
distinguish gradations in the applicability and quality of evidence.
If the parties failed to present relevant information comprehensively, however, the appellate expert could advise the court that
evidence outside the record would be necessary in order to respond
to an inquiry. The court could then request the parties to present
additional testimony.
Probably the appellate expert's most important function
would be to communicate information in a form assimilable by
members of the court. 14 6 Multiple applications of psychological
tests to a wide variety of professionals suggests a high correlation
between cognitive style and occupation. 147 Some studies suggest
that major differences exist between the cognitive styles of judges
14
and experts, which can preclude effective communication.
Judges, for example, tend to view problems as zero-sum games and
seek "right" or "wrong" answers.1 49 Some scientists, on the other
hand, concentrate more on underlying concepts and gradations in
correctness. 150 The phenomena of judges seeking particular blackand-white answers from economists based upon a single snapshot
frozen in time and experts dreaming of judges who deal with general concepts in terms of probability distributions appear to be almost universal.
In addition to cognitive style, the rule also stressed the
method of communication. It was originally assumed that the inquiry-response format-borrowed from interrogatory methodology-would provide high-quality information. 5 ' Subsequent analySee supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text.
ALA. R1.APP. P. 33A(b)(3)(C).
1'7 See Kerin & Slocum, Decision-Making Style and Acquisition of Information: Fur145
146

ther Exploration of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, 49 PSYCHOLOGICAL REP. 132 (Aug.
1981).
148 See Curlin, Law, Science, and Public Policy: A Problem in Communication,
in
SCIENTISTS IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM 35, 36 (W. Thomas ed. 1974).
149 "The overall hypothesis presented here is that the rule-based, fact-dominated process of legal reasoning attracts individuals whose cognitive style has difficulty with and often
rejects the legitimacy of the scientists' mode of thinking, which emphasizes uncertainty,
complexity and conceptual issues." Keen, Cognitive Style and Lawyers and Scientists 11
(Mar. 1981) (paper presented at Conference on Resolving Regulatory Issues Involving Science and Technology, April 9-11, 1981, conducted by National Center for Administrative
Justice).
150

Id.

"I See FED. R. Civ. P. 33 (advisory committee notes focus on insuring clarity and accu-
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sis suggested that the format prevented sufficient timely feedback.
In using rule 33A, therefore, the court employed a rule 33 prehearing conference wherein three justices, the appellate expert, the
parties, and their attorneys conducted a series of oral inquiries and
responses using the same format as the written ones. 15 2 The final
version of rule 33A recommended that the initial communications
between the court and expert be in writing, followed by an opportunity for oral inquiries and responses in a conference either before
or after oral argument.
D.

Results

An ongoing evaluation of five rule 33A interventions suggests
that the process has some merit. 153 A quasi-experimental design attempts to measure, both qualitatively and quantitatively, the rule's
overall benefits and losses as compared to the traditional appellate
procedure.154 The briefs, oral arguments, expert responses, and
opinions from utility ratemaking cases before, during, and after the
intervention were selected and examined with research protocols to
measure numbers of issues raised, the longevity of those issues, frequency of joinder of issues by the parties, and engagement by the
supreme court. Utility ratemaking experts performed more subjective analyses of this same material to measure the clarity and comprehensiveness of the economic and accounting evidence and discussions. Interviews of relevant interested individuals, including
members of the Alabama Supreme Court and the actual appellate
experts, were conducted before, during, and after the intervention
using survey instruments and open-ended discussions.
1. Economy. The number of utility ratemaking appeals decreased sharply after appellate experts began to be employed.155

racy of the information); Haydock & Herr, Interrogatories:Questions and Answers, 1 REV.
OF LING. 263, 265 (1981) ("[Interrogatories reveal] information which will put the parties in
realistic and informed positions from which to negotiate a settlement or stipulate to agreed
facts.")
151ALA. R App. P. 33. The prehearing conference was utilized in Union Springs Tel. Co.
v. Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 437 So. 2d 485, 487 (Ala. 1983).
1s The author is currently completing a study of the appellate expert experiment with
Professors John Heilman of Auburn and Dan Nyhart of MIT.
15 For descriptions of quasi-experimental design techniques, see CAROL WEISS, EVALUATION RESEARCH 67-73 (1972); D. CAmPBELL & J. STANLEY, ExPEm rrMAL AND QuAsI-ExPERiMENTAL DESIGNS FOR RESEARCH 34-64 (1963). For an application of evaluation research in a

legal context, see Kelly, Social Science Evaluation and Criminal Justice Policy-Making:
The Case of Pre-TrialRelease, in PUBLIC POLCY EVALUATION 253 (K. Dolbeare ed. 1975).

"' From 1976 to 1980, there were seven appeals; from 1981 to 1983, there were seven;
from 1984 to 1986, there were three.
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Arguably this occurred because the parties needed rational and
predictable answers from the court to a relatively small number of
issues in order to evaluate their cases accurately. Once those issues
had been decided, the parties were able to compromise, because
their extreme positions had been eliminated. Anecdotal evidence
involving Alabama's largest and most politically sensitive utility
suggests that this is precisely what happened-much to the satisfaction and relief of all parties interviewed. On the other hand, a
number of complicating factors, such as the decline in the inflation
rate and changes in the state's political climate, weaken the suggestion that rule 33A was a major cause of the reduction in appeals. Current techniques cannot evaluate the relative importance
of these and other variables.
However, virtually all of those interviewed consider the rule a
worthwhile experiment. 156 The quantitative and qualitative evaluations also suggest that the intervention correlated with a reduction
in issues requiring court decision, clearer and more comprehensive
economic and accounting evidence, increased joinder of issues by
the parties, and more substantial engagement by the court of the
fundamental questions raised on appeal.
Using the previously stated economy criteria, both ex ante and
ex post analyses indicate that the intervention was worthwhile.
The biggest problems were related to cost and time. The appellate
experts' fees totalled approximately $30,000. There were six instances of inquiries-responses and one prehearing conference. The
parties' additional costs are not available but must be a substantial
multiple of the appellate experts' fees.
Justices of the court were generally dissatisfied with the inquiry-response communication format. They doubted whether the
appellate expert understood their questions. Moreover, they found
the time lag between posing inquiries and receiving responses unacceptable, because it forced them to refamiliarize themselves with
the case repeatedly. The prehearing conference ameliorated this
situation somewhat, although the justices would have preferred a
conference without previous written communication.
Still, the savings in error costs may substantially outweigh
these direct expenses. If the reduced number of appeals is at all
attributable to the rule, there would be enormous savings to the
court, the parties, and particularly to Alabama citizens and utility
company shareholders. If stock prices and bond ratings, net of
156 Interviews of various participants in the utility ratemaking process were conducted

by Professor John Heilman and the author.
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market effects, are any surrogate for error costs, the savings far
outweigh the expenses associated with the implementation of the
rule. 1 57 In addition, if the initial development costs of the rule are
viewed as a capital expense, the amortization of that expenditure
over the life of the rule would mitigate its negative impact.
Because of the extreme amount of energy devoted to designing
and implementing the rule, a "Hawthorne effect" may explain
some of its perceived success.' 58 Since the court and parties knew
that they were subject to intense scrutiny by academic evaluators,
they may have worked harder to produce a favorable outcome. If
this were true, the opportunity costs may have been significant.
However, in the Hawthorne experiment, the workers had little to
gain by working harder; in contrast, the ratemaking cases had independent significance for both court and parties. Therefore, any
synergy here from the presence of observers must be severely
discounted.
2. Fairness. Concerns of predictability and rationality
seemed to be met and even exceeded; virtually all the interviews
support that conclusion. Equality of opportunity and strategy were
particularly strong as well. Each side applauded the use of the appellate expert on the theory that the court could finally understand their evidence and find it persuasive. After opinions were
rendered and even in the presence of substantial disagreement
with the outcomes, most observers believed that the court was able
to appreciate the testimony presented to it.
Probably the most interesting aspect of the experiment-the
The utilities' major criticism of the ratemaking cases before rule 33A was the detrimental impact the PSC's actions were having on their ability to raise funds by selling longterm bonds and capital stock. For example, from 1978 to 1981, Alabama Power Company's
long-term bond rating was "Baa" and its capital stock rating was "ba" in Moody's Public
Utility Manuals. In 1981 its ratings began improving, and by 1985 the ratings were "Al"
and "a2" respectively. Such improvements arguably allow the utility to raise funds more
easily and cheaply.
Ise The Hawthorne effect refers to a series of studies conducted at Western Electric's
Hawthorne Plant in Chicago, which manufactured telephone equipment, between 1924 and
1932. In three experiments on the impact of changes in the amount of lighting on production rates, the level of production always increased regardless of what change was made to
the illumination. See Parsons, What Happened at Hawthorne?, 183 SCIENCE 922, 922
(1974). The popular belief was that the subjects endeavored to give the researchers the perceived desired outcome. The validity of this view has been questioned. See id.; see also
Adair, The Hawthorne Effect: A Reconsideration of the Methodological Artifact, 69 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 334 (1984). For additional analyses of the problems of the overly cooperative subject, see Adair & Schachter, To Cooperate or to Look Good?: The Subjects' and
157

Experimenters' Perceptions of Each Others' Intentions, 8 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL-

74 (1972); Sigall, Aronson & Van Hoose, The Cooperative Subject: Myth or Reality?, 6
J. EXPERIMENrAL SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 1 (1970).
OGY
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use of an expert by an appellate court-never generated significant debate. Because of the direct appeal, the court's de novo review of the confiscation issue, and perceived dissatisfaction with
the existing system, none of the interested parties seemed concerned with this unprecedented use of an expert. If rule 33A were
used in other contexts, however, intense debate would probably
159
ensue.
3. Other Values. Values of dignity and participation were
also apparently satisfied. The parties seemed reassured that by
participating in selecting the expert and having an opportunity for
a prehearing conference, their positions were effectively presented
and were understood by the court.
Although it appears that the intervention was worthwhile, the
court has not sought permanent funding for appellate experts nor
has it expanded rule 33A beyond utility ratemaking. Courts in
other states may be interested in adopting the rule, but no implementation has yet occurred outside of Alabama. The delay in publishing an evaluation and limited dissemination of information
concerning rule 33A may partially account for the absence of transfer at this time.
IV.

A.

MASS TORTS: CAN WE PRIORITIZE THE QUEUE?

Problem

Approximately 9,000 asbestos-related personal injury cases
were filed nationally between March 1983, and July 1985.160 Many
commentators suggest that they pose a significant threat to the viability of our litigation system, in that the courts cannot render
rational decisions in these cases at an acceptable cost in time and
16 1
money.
In the initial stages of the asbestos litigation difficult legal issues were presented to the courts: the "state of the art" defense,
scope of insurance coverage, statutes of limitations, identification
of parties, and evidentiary questions such as the admissibility of

15 Relatively few attorneys represent parties in utility ratemaking procedures. The Advisory Committee on the Appellate Rules of Procedure and the bar generally deferred to the
desires of these few attorneys. In other types of litigation, there would be greater difference
of opinions and less likelihood of consensus.
160 D. HENSLER, W. FELSTiNER, M. SELvN & P. EBENER, ASBESTOS IN THE COuRTS: THE
CHALLENGE OF MASS Toxic TORTS 21 (1985) (33,000 asbestos actions as of July 1985, up
from 24,000 in March 1983).
161 See, e.g., Smith & Channon, The Rising Storm, 17 FORUM 139 (1981).
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evidence of design changes."6 2 Although a few legal issues remain
to be resolved, most jurisdictions have set legal standards on most
issues. 6 s Historically, the factual issues have not been unusually
complex; testimony concerning liability, exposure, and injuries is
similar to what one would expect in other product liability tort
cases."" The real complexity comes from the huge number of
plaintiffs and defendants. On average, each plaintiff sues twenty
defendants, and judges frequently find more than fifty lawyers at
pretrial conferences. 6 5
In some jurisdictions the resolution of asbestos disease cases
correlates with normal disposition rates.166 In other jurisdictions
there is substantial stagnation. 67 The variance can largely be explained by the rate and number of filings, the number of competing cases, the attention given by the judiciary, the behavioral patterns of the local bar, and the incentives of parties and attorneys.
In jurisdictions where dockets have become overloaded, the resources of courts, attorneys, and parties are simply inadequate to
cope. Typically an extremely small number of firms represents
massive numbers of plaintiffs; it would not be unusual for a single
lawyer with four associates to represent over a thousand clients.6 8
Defense teams are typically of similar size. 6 " The defendants' resources-in both defending suits and paying judgments-are often
strained. These problems become particularly acute in the absence
of cooperation among the lawyers. After August of 1982 the absence of the Manville attorneys, who had been the natural leaders
of the defense effort, sometimes left an organizational vacuum
162 See K.

BUSHNELL & W. JORDAN, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION

(1984); see also McGovern, Toxic Substances Litigation in the Fourth Circuit, 16 U. RIcH
L. REv. 247 (1982); Comment, An Examinationof Recurring Issues in Asbestos Litigation,
46 ALB. L. REV. 1307 (1982).

"I3THOMAS
DURES
14

E. WILLGING, ASBESTOS CASE MANAGEMENT

PRETRIAL AND TRIAL PROCE-

9 (1985).
See, e.g., Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 107 F.R.D. 250, 253 (S.D. Tex.

1985).
166 Parrish, Dimensions of the Problem, 8 STATE CT. J. 5, 6-7 (1984); see also Hamilton,
Rabinovitz & Szanton, Inc., Cutting the Overhead Costs of Resolving Asbestos Claims: A
Time for Action, 6 J. PROD. LIAB. 17, 22 (1983).
16 See D. HENSLER, W. FELSTINER, M. SELviN & P. EBENEE, supra note 160, at 84-85.
167 See id. (among the results found by the Rand Corporation's researchers were: after
more than six years of litigation, only 11% of cases filed in state court in San Francisco had
been completed; the disposition rate of action cases in the Middlesex, New Jersey, state
court was less than 20%; and at a present [annual disposition] rate of 13%, it will take
decades to resolve the claims filed in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas).
16I Id. at 89 n.6.
119 J. KAKALIK, P. EBENER, W. FELSTINER, G. HAGGSTROM & M. SHANLEY, VARIATION IN
ASBESTOS LITIGATION COMPENSATION AND EXPENSES 20 (1984).
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which has exacerbated this situation. 170

Regardless of the local situation, approximately 98 percent of
the asbestos disease cases that were resolved were settled; only 2
percent of the cases concluded with a jury verdict. 1 71 Most settlements, however, occurred on the eve of trial. The major bottleneck
was the scarcity of trial dates; judicial trial time became the
scarcest resource in the dispute resolution process.
In 1983 there were almost 80 asbestos cases pending in the
Northern District of Ohio. Some of them had been on file for over
three years and had been assigned to nine different judges. Two
trials had been held in federal court, one in state court, and 64
cases had been settled. Judge Thomas D. Lambros decided that
the resolution rate of the asbestos disease cases had been sufficiently desultory and was so delaying the progress of unrelated
cases that a new methodology was needed to handle them. 72 He
consolidated all the asbestos cases in his court and appointed two
special masters to develop an Ohio Asbestos Litigation Case Management Plan (OAL Plan) for resolving all pending cases within a
two-year period.

73

B. Diagnosis
The high settlement rates in asbestos disease cases can be explained in part by the medical consensus that asbestos does cause
certain diseases-asbestosis, mesothelioma, and certain other cancers. 7 4 The genuine issues in these lawsuits typically concern

whether this plaintiff was exposed to asbestos, whether the asbestos was manufactured by these defendants, whether it was manufactured at a time when defendants did not fulfill their legal obligations to users of their products, and whether this plaintiff's
injuries were asbestos-related. For individuals who had a disease
caused by asbestos and who had experienced massive exposure to
170 Johns Manville Corporation, one of the foremost producers of asbestos products in
the United States, filed for reorganization under Chapter 11 out of a concern that its assets
were insufficient to satisfy all potential claims for personal injury and property damage from
asbestos. See, e.g., In re Johns Manville Corp., No. 82 B 11656 (BRL) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.,
pending since 1982).
171 OHIO ASBESTOS LITIGATION: CASE MANAGEMENT PLAN AND CASE EVALUATION AND ApPORTIONMENT PROcESS 5-6 (Dec. 16, 1983).
172 In re Ohio Asbestos Litigation, No. 83-OAL (N.D. Ohio General Order No. 67 filed
June 1, 1983).
173 Id. (N.D. Ohio Order No. 3 fied July 14, 1983).
174 See I. SELIKOFF & D. LEE, AsBESTOS AND DISEASE 143-56, 241-44, 262-66, 307-21, 32627 (1978); Becklake, Asbestos-related Diseases of the Lungs and Pleura, 126 AM. REV. RESPIRATORY DISEASE 187 (1982).
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asbestos when the producers had a legal duty to reduce the risk of
exposure to asbestos but did not, the only argument was over the
amount of money that should be paid.
Ironically, the success of the obviously-injured plaintiffs created much of the asbestos litigation problem. Virtually anyone who
had ever worked with asbestos had an incentive to bring suit. The
commons became standing room only.17 5 Our traditional litigation
mechanism, which values minimizing false-positive damage
awards-awarding no compensation to undeserving plaintiffs-mandated first-come, first-served individual trials. As a result, a lengthy queue of litigants developed. Defendants and even
some plaintiffs' attorneys had little incentive to expedite the decisionmaking process-the plaintiffs themselves bore the brunt of
1 78
the slowdown.
Because of the extensive history of asbestos litigation, however, there was some theoretical support for an ADR methodology
to prioritize the cases in the queue that Judge Lambros regarded
as unacceptably long. 177 If some mechanism could identify the
probable true positive and true negative plaintiffs early and inexpensively, then plaintiffs who had greater chances of succeeding
might be placed at the head of the queue. Defendants appeared
willing to settle in clear cases, but desired more scrutiny for the
less obviously meritorious suits. If greater judicial resources were
allocated to the more serious cases, they should settle quickly; then
public acceptance should develop for the remaining cases to compete with other lawsuits for judicial attention. This was precisely
what the Speedy Trial Act did by expediting the resolution of
17 8
criminal cases.
This theory views litigation as an information system generating massive amounts of data, from which one can isolate the variables critical to jury awards and settlements.17 9 It then might be
175 Just as the village or global commons may be destroyed by overuse, see supra note
98, the assets of defendants may be totally depleted before all claims are satisfied. In filing
for Chapter 11 reorganization, the Johns Manville Corporation cited "a predicted $2 billion
liability to unknown, future claimants." Riley, Asbestos: New Approaches, Nat'l L.J., May
7, 1984, at 1, col. 1 & 25, col. 1; see also Lauter, Dalkon Shield Cases Thrown into Disarray,
Nat'l L.J., Mar. 17, 1986, at 1, col. 2 & 10, col. 1 (by mid-1985, A.H. Robins and its insurer
had expended nearly $517 million in judgments and settlements).
17 See D. HENSLER, W. FELSTINER, M. SELvIN & P. EBENER,supra note 160, at 89-94.
177

See In re Ohio Asbestos Litigation, No. 83-OAL (N.D. Ohio Order No. 2 filed June

15, 1983 & Order No. 3 fied July 14, 1983).
178 See 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (1982).
17M

See generally Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Torts (1986) (unpub-

lished manuscript).
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possible to list the outcome-determinative factors, weigh their relative importance, and create a model to predict the value of pending cases. Prioritizing can then be performed on a reasoned basis.
The arguably idiosyncratic nature of litigation outcomes might
limit the predictive power of the information generated. In the
mass tort context, however, it has been suggested that a marketplace of multiple trials, over time, results in a rough equilibrium of
case values. 18 0 This cyclical theory of mass torts holds that a defined pattern in these cases will culminate in trials and settlements
having approximately equivalent outcomes. In the early stages of
the cycle, defendants tend to win more cases than plaintiffs because of strategic and informational superiority. If the litigation
has any merit, however, plaintiffs will eventually develop successful information and strategies and win an extremely high percentage of the cases tried. Next, the plaintiffs will bring cases for trial
that stretch the envelope of viable plaintiffs too far, and defendants will create more effective counterstrategies, resulting in a reduced percentage of plaintiff victories. Eventually, after full aggregation and dissemination of information, crystallization of the law,
and thorough development of strategies, there will be a rough equilibrium of trial results. Remaining variations will then be due to
jury demographics, attorney caliber, and random events during trials.181 Although perhaps it is counter-intuitive, settlements will
also reflect this equilibrium: the average settlement amount will be
virtually identical to the average jury verdict."8 2 The variance,
however, will be substantially different.1 83 Settlements for similarly
situated plaintiffs will be extremely similar; verdicts will vary in
accordance with idiosyncrasies of the trial process.
If this cyclical theory of mass torts were remotely correct, it
would be feasible to extrapolate from the information generated in
the equilibrium state to predict the values of pending cases. If the
parties could use these predictions to evaluate their cases prior to
expending the substantial transaction costs associated with discovery and trial, both sides would have an incentive to settle. Under
classic negotiation theory, most personal injury suits are viewed as
8 Id.
See Priest & Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1,
3-6 (1984).
181

182See, e.g., 1

JOHN E. ROLPH, AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COMPENSATION, VOLUME 1: WHO

PAYS How MUCH How SOON? 26-27 (1985) (results of a study of the experience in automobile accidents).
183 Id.; cf. H. RAIFFA, supra note 76, at 70-73.
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zero-sum games or distributive bargains. 8 Each additional dollar
received by a plaintiff comes directly from a defendant's pocket. In
contrast, furnishing both sides with case value predictions should
permit them to bargain integratively. 185 When the difference between defendant's offer and plaintiff's demand is less than the projected transaction costs for traditional trial, each side would benefit by settling anywhere between that offer and demand.
The key problem with this scenario relates to the fundamental
goal of expediting payments to plaintiffs through private settlements. Defendants, eager to retain their limited resources by slowing the velocity of cash outflow, might still resist early settlements,
particularly if they perceived that several jurisdictions would adopt
similar procedures. Plaintiffs' attorneys might prefer traditional
procedures because they tend to satisfice'86 under the traditional
system and would find the lack of public knowledge of jury verdicts detrimental to their efforts to seek recompense for as yet unidentified plaintiffs. Other incentives, such as limiting fees for
plaintiffs' attorneys and structuring settlements over time, might
be necessary to encourage defendants further. Given the small
number of plaintiffs' attorneys and a recognition that their contingent fees involved little contingency, mass settlements might still
be palatable even with these limitations. The fundamental problem here was to determine how far the court could and should go
in creating artificial incentives that arguably would rob a party of
its rights to due process by effectively coercing settlements.
C.

Prescription

In accordance with the appointment by Judge Lambros, the
special masters designed a case management plan that alters the
traditional procedural model by adding both cooperative and in"" "Distributive bargaining is concerned with the allocation of shares within the
framework of a relatively fixed set of resources." Erickson, Holmes, Frey, Walker & Thibaut, Functions of a Third Party in the Resolution of Conflict: The Role of a Judge in
PretrialConference, 30 J. PEmSoNALrrY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 293, 294 (1974). Any gain by one
party requires a corresponding loss by the other party. A dispute over money, such as a
personal injury lawsuit, generally involves distributive bargaining.
18' For example, among the cited virtues of the mini-trial are that it allows a "greater
capacity to arrive at 'win/win' results (negotiation) because the business representatives can

work out their integrative solution," S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, DIsPuTE RESOLUTION 274-75 (1985), and that it potentially saves the cost of continuing litigative combat, id.

at 277-78.
186 This term was coined by economist Herbert Simons to describe a decisionmaker
who is willing to "settle for good-enough answers in despair of finding best answers."
Simons, Administrative Decision Making, 25 PuB. An. REv. 31, 33 (1985).
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quisitorial components.187 Not all parties had complete data concerning past trials and settlements. Typically, a plaintiff achieved
settlement by negotiating with individual defendants, who seemed
less concerned with how much they paid in absolute dollars than
with how much they paid relative to other defendants. As a result,
some defendants preferred to keep their settlement amounts secret. Plaintiffs, not reluctant to play defendants off against each
other, were the only ones to know the total settlement value of
most cases. The masters arranged to gather that information and
compile it in a form that each party could use.
The parties were interviewed in great detail concerning the
objective and subjective factors by which they evaluated cases.
Then discovery was scheduled so that the minimum information
essential for an acceptable case evaluation would be gathered first.
Next, a pretrial conference allowed the parties to explore settlement possibilities prior to expending substantial funds to obtain
data that would be more valuable for trial. To assist this process,
we examined the kinds of evidence typically gathered for various
purposes, and attempted to ensure that the marginal cost of obtaining information for settlement did not exceed its marginal
value. One by-product of applying this theory was to defer the
most expensive discovery until after the initial settlement conference, thereby increasing the chances for integrative bargaining. Finally, the masters felt that communication breakdowns among the
parties warranted the use of mediation. We recommended that
Judge Lambros, who has a national reputation as an effective settlement facilitator, fulfill that role.
This prescription relied upon procedures that were generally
acceptable to the parties as long as they felt they had the ultimate
option of seeking a jury determination. We deferred recommending
more draconian proposals that would intensify the pressures for
settlement. The OAL Plan did, however, list a number of alterations that might be considered if the process did not function satisfactorily.' Despite the mildness and acceptability of its innovations, the OAL Plan was criticized for valuing expedition over
accuracy.
1. Parties. Given the large number of plaintiffs and the lim287 OHIO ASBESTOS LITIGATION: CASE MANAGEMENT PLAN AND CASE EVALUATION AND AP-

11-12.
at 105-12 (the suggestions included abbreviated Consolidated Discovery Re-

PORTIONMENT PROCESS

18 Id.

quests, counsel coordination, offers of settlement, pre-judgment interest, discovery restrictions, and standardization).
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ited time Judge Lambros had allocated, it was necessary to consolidate cases for disposition. The cases were organized into separate
clusters of five cases each.""9 The key issue was how to constitute
each cluster. Should we select cases by the traditional first-come,
first-served method, or group similar cases to facilitate presenting
evidence at trial, or combine cases representing each of the plaintiff categories? Differences-oriented negotiation theory suggested
that settlements would be easier to achieve by creating bargaining
groups including both weaker and stronger cases from each side's
perspective. We decided, therefore, to select a representative case
from each disease category. To streamline the process further, the
clusters were organized into two separate tracks that would proceed concurrently through the litigation schedule. Thus, ten cases
would be available for treatment at each stage of discovery, settlement negotiation, and trial.
While increasing the number of plaintiffs, the OAL Plan suggested reducing the number of defense counsel as much as possible. Since the local bar had de facto leaders, it was not necessary to
appoint lead counsel. The negotiations among producers of asbestos and their insurers subsequently improved on this approach by
hiring single counsel to represent multiple defendants. 190
These so-called Wellington negotiations also solved another
problem encountered under the OAL Plan. Settlement and judgment dollars were generally paid by producers, multiple insurers,
excess carriers, and reinsurers. Early in the asbestos litigation producers and insurers heatedly debated which parties bore the risk
for asbestos-related injuries. 9 ' Some focused on the time a plaintiff was exposed to asbestos,'19 2 while others emphasized the time
189Id. at 10 (categories were insulation cases, manufacturing products cases (e.g., plant
workers), friction materials cases (e.g., brake repairers), asbestos and other materials cases
(e.g., roofers), and employer defendant cases (e.g., intentional harm claims)).
1,6In situations where the claim cannot be resolved through the Asbestos Claims Facility or an ADR procedure, the Facility will defend any civil court litigation and will employ a
single team of lawyers. Wellington, Asbestos: The Private Management of a Public Problem, 33 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 375, 388 (1984-85).
"' See generally Note, Adjudicating Asbestos Insurance Liability: Alternatives to
Contract Analysis, 97 HARv. L. REv. 739, 739 (1984) ("Asbestos manufacturers and their
insurers have been engaged in extensive litigation over whether the relevant products liability insurance policy... provides indemnification for the tort claims of the victims of asbestos-related diseases.") (footnote omitted).
2,2See, e.g., Porter v. American Optical Corp., 641 F.2d 1128, 1145 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Porter, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981) (same); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1218-23 (6th Cir. 1980)
(upholding "exposure theory" over "manifestation theory"), modified, 657 F.2d 814, 816,
cert. denied sub nom. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Porter, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981).
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the disease manifested itself. 193 Circuit courts of appeals have
sharply differed on this issue,1 94 but it had become moot in the
Sixth Circuit prior to the creation of the OAL Plan. The Wellington negotiations created a common mechanism for producers and
insurers to pay settlements.
Another equally serious insurance problem remained. The majority of general comprehensive insurance policies provided a defined sum of money to indemnify the insured producers for settlement and judgment costs, and an undefined sum to pay defense
19 5
costs associated with protecting the insured in the litigation.
96
This type of contractual relationship created a moral hazard.1
The producers had already paid premiums entitling them to a virtually infinite amount of defense costs associated with indemnity
payments up to the limits of the primary policy. Therefore, their
incentives were to force the insurers to spend those dollars in order
to protect the finite amount of indemnity dollars purchased. Many
primary insurers, on the other hand, recognized that they would
eventually have to tender all of the indemnity dollars contracted
for. Their incentives were to reduce the transaction costs associated with compensating plaintiffs for their injuries because once
indemnity dollars were exhausted, they would no longer be obliged
to pay defense costs. 97 These disparate incentives created disparate defense strategies. To assist the parties in resolving their conflict, Judge Lambros brought insurance company representatives
into the negotiation process. The Wellington agreement eventually
accomplished the same goal by creating a defined method for its
193 Eagle-Picher Indus. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12, 19-21 (1st Cir. 1982)
(adopting the "manifestation theory" over the "exposure theory"), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1028 (1983).
19 In addition to the contrasting treatments by the 5th, 6th and 1st Circuits, the District of Columbia Circuit has adopted both theories in allowing for multiple triggers of coverage. Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982). Despite the wide variance in holdings, the Supreme Court has
declined to resolve the conflict.
191See Wellington, supra note 190, at 384 (citing cases supporting the asbestos producers' contention "that insurance policies written on forms developed before October 1966
provide a defense obligation that survives the exhaustion of indemnity limits").
'" See Pauly, Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral
Hazard and Adverse Selection, 88 Q.J. EcoN. 44 (1974); Shavell, On Moral Hazard and
Insurance, 92 Q.J. EcoN. 540 (1979).
197 Compare Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 597 F. Supp. 946, 950-54 (D.D.C.
1984) (insurer's duty is limited based on the pre-1966 policy language), with Commercial
Union Ins. Co. v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 553 F. Supp. 425, 429-31 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (ambiguous policy language construed in favor of the insured).
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members to pay both defense and indemnity costs.19 8
Besides altering the configuration of existing parties, the GAL
Plan expected the special masters and their assistants to act as
neutral third parties, gathering and organizing information not
otherwise available. The judge would also mediate between the
parties, to seek areas for cooperation.
2. Issues. The OAL Plan neither expanded nor contracted issues. However, it divided issues into two categories and reconstituted the agenda for considering each category."" In the first category were issues related to case evaluation. One of the masters
concentrated on insuring that the minimal amount of discovery
necessary for a threshold case evaluation was gathered first, 0 0 including the total values of earlier similar cases. If the parties did
not settle, then extensive discovery would be undertaken for trial.
The second category covered issues related to apportioning
damages among defendants.2 0 1 The parties received information
concerning the historic shares paid by each defendant in past trials
and settlements. The Wellington negotiations obviated the need to
develop these issues fully by undertaking separate negotiations to
allocate responsibility among defendants using a system similar,
but national in scope, to that proposed in the OAL Plan. 2
3. Information. In addition to the normal kinds of evidence
generated in litigation, the OAL Plan provided two types of information concerning case values: historic trial and settlement values,
and summary jury trial values. Neutral third parties gathered data
on over 300 variables for each completely resolved case. Data collection was performed by trained individuals completing a data
collection protocol, and the data was entered into a computer for
subsequent analysis. 0 3 In conjunction with policy analysts, we created a decision support system to facilitate the parties' use of the

18 See Wellington, supra note 190, at 384-85 (usually this is a question of contract
interpretation, but Wellington tried to sidestep litigating a tough issue by reaching a compromise between two polar positions).
29 The categories were "evaluation of claims" and "apportionment among defendants." OHIO ASBESTOS LITIGATION CASE MANAGEMENT PLAN AND CASE EVALUATION AND AP-

PORTIONMENT PRocEss
200 Id. at 121-24.
201

113-20 (Dec. 16, 1983); see id. at 98-99 (sample agenda).

Id. at 119-20.

Based on data collected from their past litigation experience the asbestos producers
developed a formula for allocating a liability share to every subscribing producer for all
claims presented to the Asbestos Claims Facility. See Wellington, supra note 190, at 388.
203 OHIO ASBESTOS LITIGATION, NJ. OHIO CASE MANAGEMENT PLAN AND CASE EVALUATION AND APPORTIONMENT PROCESS 121-24 (Dec. 16, 1983).
201
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collected data through computer-assisted negotiation.20 4
First, a case-matching program listed the data from a pending
case, located the three cases that it most resembled, and indicated
which characteristics did and did not match.20 5 Second, the parties
could use a decision tree analysis to evaluate cases by folding back
sequential estimates of outcomes on preliminary issues and ultimately reaching a single case value.20 6 Third, a mathematical
model using standard statistical analysis was designed to incorporate the relative importance of the critical variables during a final
case evaluation.20 7 Finally, an expert system was created to mimic
the decisionmaking process of attorneys who evaluate cases.208
The case-matching program became the only operational form
of assistance for the parties.2 0 9 Once the computer had produced
the matching cases and their values, a hearing was held to discuss
the pending cases. The parties could briefly state their analysis of
each case, the matching cases were reviewed, and we estimated a
settlement range from all this information. The settlement ranges
generally varied between 10 and 20 percent, which was usually less
than the transaction costs associated with trial. If both parties
204

Decision support systems make use of system dynamics and econometric models to

inc;ease the computer's role in the decisionnaking process. Such systems are effective to
accommodate decisions which are both sufficiently structured to allow some form of modeling and yet still require the decisionmaker's less quantifiable judgment. See generally R.
BONCZEK, C. HOLSAPPLE & A. WHINSTON, FOUNDATIONS OF DECIsION SUPPORT SYSTEMS (1981);
R. SPRAGUE & E. CARLSON, BUILDING EFFECTIVE DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS (1982); DECISION
SUPPORT SYSTEMS: A DATA-BAsED, MODEL-ORIENTED, USER-DEVELOPED DISCIPLINE (W. House
ed. 1983).
205 See MARK A. PETERSON, NEW TOOLS FOR REDUCING CIVIL LITIGATION EXPENSES 15
(1983) (if information has been gathered on prior settled and tried cases, proposed settlement values can be justified by references to similar resolved claims).
20 For discussion of decision tree methodology, see HowARD RAiFFA, DECISION ANALYSIS: INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON CHOICES UNDER UNCERTAINTY 10-38 (1968). For application
in the legal arena, see Bodily, When should you go to court?, 59 HARV. BUS. REv., May-June
1981, at 103, 105-10.
107 See M. PETERsoN, supra note 205, at 17-20.
210 For example, the Rand Corporation has been developing two such expert systems:
the Legal Decisionmaking System (assisting in the settlement of product liability cases) and
the System for Asbestos Litigation (estimating how much money should be paid to claimants). DONALD A. WATERMAN, A GUIDE TO EXPERT SYSTEMS 268-69 (1986); see also Johnson,
What Kind of Expert Should a System Be?, 8 J. MA. & PHIL. 77 (1983).
209 In addition to the computer-assisted negotiation, Judge Lambros provided the parties an opportunity to obtain case evaluation information from summary jury trials. For a
short description of the mechanics of summary jury trial, see Posner, The Summary Jury
Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHL L. REv. 366, 368-69 (1986); see also Lambros & Shunk, The Summary Jury
Trial, 29 CLEv. ST. L. REV. 43 (1980); Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution: A Report to the Judicial Conference of the United
States Committee on the Operation of the Jury System, 103 F.R.D. 461 (1984).
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commenced negotiations within the suggested range, the chances of
a settlement increased greatly.
D.

Results

All 112 cases settled within 27 months of the implementation
of the OAL Plan. All of the eventual settlements were within the
special masters' range of predicted values.
1. Economy. At first glance, the OAL Plan appears enormously successful, but substantial problems cropped up in its implementation which deserve closer scrutiny.210 The cost for special
masters, experts, computer runs, and other expenses of designing
and implementing the OAL Plan during the three-year period was
over $250,000, although a major grant from the National Institute
for Dispute Resolution softened the impact on the parties. The
court's and parties' time expenditures were also substantial. Multiple separate negotiations took place, some persisting over extended
periods of time. Forty-three OAL Plan orders have been promulgated by the court.
Although some savings were produced because no trials had to
be held, everyone's opportunity costs were nevertheless substantial. A pending evaluation of the OAL Plan will attempt to make
simplifying assumptions and suggest how the cost in time and
money compares to more traditional litigation. In all probability,
any economic justification for the OAL Plan would have to be
made in terms of a capital investment. In other words, funds were
invested to produce an asset which is not exhausted by a single
use. This approach could be justified in part by the adoption of
OAL Plan components in other jurisdictions, such as the Eastern
District of Texas and the District of Massachusetts, and by the
Wellington Plan. However, the individual plaintiffs, who absorbed
some of the costs of the OAL Plan, would find the capitalization
argument less persuasive.
A reduction in error costs may be the strongest argument for
the OAL Plan. Virtually all plaintiffs who received settlements had
long histories of asbestos exposure and had received a medical diagnosis of some asbestos-related disease. There were no false negatives in the OAL Plan-anyone who met the exposure and injury
criteria received some compensation. There may have been a small
"10

Judge Lambros has requested the author to work with a neutral study team to eval-

uate the overall merits of the OAL Plan. In addition, Professor Green and the author are
writing an article about their experiences.
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number of false positives, but the rigorous entry criteria minimized

them.
2. Fairness.An evaluation for fairness also gives mixed reviews. The plaintiffs and their attorneys generally seemed pleased
that the cases were being resolved speedily, without full trials and
expensive discovery. Defendants and their attorneys seemed less
satisfied. They found the original OAL Plan overly complex, the
constant revisions disconcerting, and the court's interventionist
posture constraining on their ability to represent their clients as
they saw fit. Defendants did not feel that the settlements were excessive, but that they had insufficient opportunity to prepare complete defenses. They believe that as product liability law has been
applied to asbestos cases, plaintiffs have the advantage and defendants must engage in extensive discovery to prove that a person
does not deserve compensation. Plaintiffs' attorneys have typically
responded to these arguments by noting a propensity for defense
counsel to churn cases and for defendants to hold on to their assets
as long as possible. The ongoing evaluation should give a clearer
picture of the reality behind these sentiments.
3. Other Values. Plaintiffs and their attorneys also appeared
to appreciate being able to participate in the evaluation conferences and did not view the decision support system as impinging
on their individual sense of worth. Defendants and their attorneys,
on the other hand, preferred the more traditional methodology for
resolving cases and felt that the court had partially usurped their
usual case management prerogatives. As a result, they reacted negatively to losing control of the litigation.
A final, compelling argument in favor of the GAL Plan is its
consistency with the underlying values of product liability law.
Most states, including Ohio, have adopted strict liability in tort,
thereby making it easier for plaintiffs to recover. Society, through
its expression of tort law, has decided to accept a greater frequency
of personal injury awards in order to heighten the incentives to
manufacturers to produce safer products. Much of the defendants'
criticism concerning the value of expediting the litigation process
can be viewed as a basic disagreement with the policies underlying
strict tort liability.
Judge Lambros had decided in 1982 that traditional litigation
was biased toward inefficient dispute resolution, and had asked the
special masters to design a management plan that would reduce
that inefficiency while maintaining other due process values. Far
more sophisticated analysis will be necessary to determine the relative merits of the OAL Plan and the traditional litigation model.
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In this instance the ex ante analysis of the OAL Plan may appear
more favorable than an ex post one.
V.

CONCLUSION

Flaws exist in our current litigation system. The thesis of this
article is that overallegiance to traditional methods of dispute resolution can create substantial barriers to effective resolution of complex disputes. Judges and attorneys who use the same set of procedures in every case can anticipate less than satisfactory results.
The issue raised here is whether acceptable alternatives to current
practices can be applied without losing substantial values embedded in those practices.
Both the litigation management and ADR movements suggest
that significant benefits can be achieved if judges and attorneys
become active in tailoring procedures to meet the needs of individual disputes. The three cases discussed above illustrate how techniques can be adapted to a given dispute. Most of the innovations-computer-assisted negotiation, scorable game, appellate
expert, and case evaluation decision support system-draw heavily
on inquisitorial elements commonly associated with European justice systems and cooperative efforts found in negotiation. Yet
nothing inherent in the descriptive analysis requires solely inquisitorial and cooperative changes. Equally important as these concrete proposals is the spirit of experimentation-a quest to find
new methods of resolving disputes to improve the administration
of justice. Yet this experimentation should be carefully monitored
to ensure that no intermediate injustices are created, and must be
painstakingly evaluated to determine when replication is advisable.
Notwithstanding the apparent success of the new case management techniques described above, there is still risk associated
with any substantial deviation from accepted procedures. When
are these risks worth taking? What specific criteria indicate how to
apply any new techniques? What happens when these criteria conflict? These and similar questions cry out for a more systematic,
principled approach to the management of complex cases. If the
managerial horse is indeed out of the barn, we need a theory for
managing the horsepower.
Such a theory should take into account not only the identifiable objective criteria of cases, but also a host of more subtle factors which may be just as important to the perceived legitimacy of
our dispute resolution system. For example, some procedural innovations owe much of their success to an ability to change the way
the participants in the litigation relate to one another. Among
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other effects, such techniques may alter the balance of power
among the parties. An example of this would be if a special master,
while streamlining discovery or facilitating settlement negotiations,
innocently disclosed to a party information which seemed obvious
to the master, yet which provoked an insight that the party would
otherwise have missed. This relatively innocuous alteration in
power effects can become more serious in light of recent findings in
the behavioral literature regarding mediators. First, certain personality types seem to be peculiarly suitable for mediation. 21 1 Second,
a trait which often accompanies natural mediation ability is a desire for power. 212 Therefore, precisely those persons who can be the
most effective mediators may be most tempted to exercise power
over the litigants, perhaps in subtle ways. Yet attempts to forestall
abuses by constraining masters' discretion and flexibility may impede their effectiveness.2 13
It is suggested here that the descriptive literature on litigation
management should be expanded by developing actual case histories. Unfortunately, most of the current literature consists of less
than systematic anecdotal accounts. A consistent descriptive methodology is necessary to enable more sophisticated treatment. The
analysis presented here focuses on the number and identity of the
parties, the amount and nature of the information, the selection
and ordering of the issues, and the behavioral patterns of the participants. Reasoning inductively from these descriptive analyses
may assist the development of more principled methods of case
management. The challenge for this and following articles, then, is
to devise a general functional approach to managing complex
litigation.
Based upon my experience in these cases, I argue that efforts
to improve dispute resolution practices rather than limit access to
the courts should be supported. Flexibility should be given to decisionmakers who, looking at a lawsuit ex ante, determine that reasonable men would agree that the net benefits from an alternative
approach exceed those of the existing system. Armed with principles, methodology, exuberant skepticism, and an openness to pub211 See Goleman, Influencing Others:Skills Are Identified, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1986,

at 15, col. 1 (national edition); see also Gurucharri & Selman, The Development of Interpersonal UnderstandingDuring Childhood, Preadolescence,and Adolescence: A Longitudinal Follow-up Study, 53 CmILD DEV. 924 (1982).
212

Id.

213 See McCrory, Environmental Mediation-AnotherPiece for the Puzzle, 6 VT. L.

REV. 49, 51 (1981); Stulberg, The Theory and Practiceof Mediation:A Reply to Professor
Susskind, 6 VT. L. REv. 85, 115-16 (1981).
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lic scrutiny, the movement toward managerial judging and alternative dispute resolution can assist our transition into the next era of
the administration of justice.

